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Jagatjit Industries Limited Vs The Intellectual PrSC2016220116154628247COM194367
Jagatjit Industries Limited Vs The Intellectual PrSC2016220116154628247COM194367
Equivalent Citation: 2016(2)ABR74, AIR2016SC 478, 2016(2)AJR275, 2016(2)ALD172, 2016 2 AWC 2029SC , 2016 (2) C C C 59 ,
2016(1)C DR251(SC ), [2016]130C LA411(SC ), 120(3)C WN79, 2016/INSC /74, 2016-4-LW657, 2016(65)PTC 242(SC ), 2016(1)SC ALE450,
(2016)4SC C 381, 2016 (5) SC J 143, [2016]1SC R808
JUDGMENT
Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.
Leave granted.
1. The Respondent No. 4 is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the United
States of America. It is an ultimate subsidiary of Pernord Ricard S.A., which is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing a variety of alcoholic
beverages worldwide. It claims that it has coined and adopted the trademark
'BLENDERS PRIDE' through its licensee M/s. Seagram Company Limited in the year
1973. According to Respondent No. 4, on account of extensive sales and marketing
worldwide, the trademark 'BLENDERS PRIDE' has come to acquire a tremendous
reputation in various countries including India. In order to secure its proprietary
No. TOP/
Copy forwarded for information to REMFRY & SGAR
Sd/-
ASSISTANT EXAMINER of TRADE MARKS
Dated: 16-Feb. 2004.
16. A perusal of this letter shows that the notice of opposition was taken on record.
This could not have been done unless time had been extended by one month, as the
said notice of opposition was filed only on 19.1.2004, i.e. within the 30 days period
after three months were over on 6.1.2004. Though Section 131 of the Act refers to
the Registrar's satisfaction and refers to conditions which he may think fit to impose,
it is clear that he need not pass a separate order in every case if he wishes to extend
the time. The decision of the Madras High Court being Allied Blenders and
Distillers Private Limited, Mumbai v. Intellectual Property Appellate Board,
Chennai and Ors. MANU/TN/2246/2009 : AIR 2009 Madras 196 was referred to, in
particular paragraph 27 thereof, to show that Section 131 cannot apply to the facts of
this case because the said Sub-section will not apply where time to do a thing is
expressly provided in this Act. It is true that time to file a notice of opposition is to
be done within the time that is expressly provided in Section 21(1) and that Section
131 of the Act would not therefore apply. However, Section 131 is a pointer to the
fact that the extension of time by the Registrar is a ministerial act for which no
hearing is required.
17. Smt. Prathiba Singh also argued that the expression "allows" in Section 21(1)
would further show that there has to be an order in writing granting an extension of
time and no such order has been produced in the present case. She also cited M.
Mazharuddin Ali v. Govt. of A.P. (2000) 10 SCC 383, at paragraphs 7 and 11, to
show that in the context of relaxation of Rules made Under Article 309, a specific
relaxation by a written order is necessary or else there can be said to be no
relaxation of such Rules in law. We may note that the aforesaid judgment deals with
the Governor's executive power Under Article 166 of the Constitution. Such power
can only be exercised in writing and in the manner prescribed by the said Article.
Besides, the Governor's power is an executive power and not a quasi-judicial one, as
is the power of the Registrar in the present case. This judgment, therefore, does not
further case of the Appellant. Also, it is settled law that procedural provisions are to
be construed in a manner that advances and does not subvert the cause of justice.
This Court in paragraphs 28 and 29 in Kailash v. Nanhku MANU/SC/0264/2005 :
(2005) 4 SCC 480, has held as under:
All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language
employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but
the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the
cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be
denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation.
Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute, the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure or any other procedural enactment
ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless
to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations