機制設計
閱讀設定
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機制設計(粵拼:gei1 zai3 cit3 gai3;英文:mechanism design)係經濟學同博弈論嘅一個子領域,重點係採取一個工程學嘅思考方式嚟設計經濟:科學會運用科學方法了解世界,而工程學就係靠科學得到嘅知識嘗試設計出有用嘅技術;經濟學同機制設計之間嘅關係一樣-經濟學運用科學方法研究人類分配有限資源嘅過程,而機制設計就會運用經濟學得到嘅知識,務求設計出適當嘅政策,令人類有足夠嘅誘因做出政策制定者想佢哋做嘅決策[1][2]。機制設計又有叫掉轉博弈論(reverse game theory)-博弈論分析做嘅係由一個經濟環境嘅規則,預計決策者會做出乜行為,而機制設計就掉返轉,做嘅嘢係由「想要嘅行為」做起點,再思考要制定乜嘢規則先可以引誘人做出呢啲行為[3]。
想像幅附圖:附圖左上角嘅空間 包含可能採取嘅行動同策略,而右上角嘅空間 X 包含可能嘅報償, 函數講明每個行動或者策略 嘅相應報償, 代表機制設計者向博弈者傳達嘅資訊, 代表個博弈環境,均衡狀態 要設計成達到某啲特定嘅 。
步驟
[編輯]做機制設計嘅步驟大致上如下[4]:
- 定義是次機制設計嘅目的,想要引誘人做出乜行為;
- 由每個個體嘅角度出發,用博弈論思考嗰個個體嘅效益(utility)函數係乜樣,當中可以涉及行為經濟學嘅考量(例:, 代表個人做理想行為會得到嘅滿足感, 同 等代表已知會影響滿足感嘅因素),得出一個描述個體行為嘅數學模型;
- 運用微積分等嘅數學技術,計吓柞因素( 同 等)要設成乜數值,先可以令個人做出理想行為嘅機率最大化(,假設 最大化等如個人會做理想行為嘅機率都最大化)-如果柞因素係政策制定者有權力控制嘅,噉就可以得出一個「要採取乜行動」嘅具體計劃。
睇埋
[編輯]參考文獻
[編輯]- Clarke, Edward H. (1971). "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods" (PDF). Public Choice. 11 (1): 17–33. doi:10.1007/BF01726210. JSTOR 30022651.
- Gibbard, Allan (1973). "Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 587–601. doi:10.2307/1914083. JSTOR 1914083.
- Groves, Theodore (1973). "Incentives in Teams" (PDF). Econometrica. 41 (4): 617–631. doi:10.2307/1914085. JSTOR 1914085.
- Harsanyi, John C. (1967). "Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players, I-III. part I. The Basic Model". Management Science. 14 (3): 159–182. doi:10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159. JSTOR 2628393.
- Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation". Review of Economic Studies. 38 (2): 175–208. doi:10.2307/2296779. JSTOR 2296779.
- Myerson, Roger B.; Satterthwaite, Mark A. (1983). "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading". Journal of Economic Theory. 29 (2): 265–281. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen (1975). "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions". Journal of Economic Theory. 10 (2): 187–217. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.471.9842. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2.
- Vickrey, William (1961). "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders" (PDF). The Journal of Finance. 16 (1): 8–37.
參考書
[編輯]- Chapter 7 of Fudenberg, Drew; Tirole, Jean (1991), Game Theory, Boston: MIT Press, ISBN 978-0-262-06141-4. A standard text for graduate game theory.
- Chapter 23 of Mas-Colell; Whinston; Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-507340-9. A standard text for graduate microeconomics.
- Milgrom, Paul (2004), Putting Auction Theory to Work, New York: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-55184-7. Applications of mechanism design principles in the context of auctions.
- Noam Nisan. A Google tech talk on mechanism design.
- Legros, Patrick; Cantillon, Estelle (2007). "What is mechanism design and why does it matter for policy-making?". Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Roger B. Myerson (2008). "Mechanism Design," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, Abstract.
攷
[編輯]- ↑ Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American economic review, 93(3), 729-747.
- ↑ Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2012, August). Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking (pp. 173-184). ACM.
- ↑ Mechanism Design Theory.
- ↑ Bowles, S., & Hwang, S. H. (2008). Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives. Journal of Public Economics, 92(8-9), 1811-1820.
拎
[編輯]- Eric Maskin, "Nobel Prize Lecture" delivered on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University.