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TECHNIQUES
PRE-ATT&CK
Priority Definition Planning
Priority Definition Direction
Target Selection
Technical Information Gathering
People Information Gathering
Organizational Information Gathering
Technical Weakness Identification
People Weakness Identification
Organizational Weakness Identification
Adversary OPSEC
Establish & Maintain Infrastructure
Persona Development
Build Capabilities
Test Capabilities
Stage Capabilities
Enterprise
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
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  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Remote Services
  5. Distributed Component Object Model

Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model

ID Name
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model
T1021.004 SSH
T1021.005 VNC
T1021.006 Windows Remote Management

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

The Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.[1][2]

Permissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.[3] By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.[4]

Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications[5] as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods.[6][7] DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents[8] and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application[9], bypassing the need for a malicious document.

ID: T1021.003
Sub-technique of:  T1021
Tactic: Lateral Movement
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, DLL monitoring, Packet capture, PowerShell logs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs
Version: 1.0
Created: 11 February 2020
Last Modified: 23 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can deliver "beacon" payloads for lateral movement by leveraging remote COM execution.[13]
Empire

Empire can utilize Invoke-DCOM to leverage remote COM execution for lateral movement.[14]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Ensure all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled.[12]
Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Consider disabling DCOM through Dcomcnfg.exe.[11]
Network Segmentation

Enable Windows firewall, which prevents DCOM instantiation by default.
Privileged Account Management

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{{{{AppID_GUID}}}} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.[3]

Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do not set their own process-wide security.[10] [4]

Detection

Monitor for COM objects loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application.[5] Enumeration of COM objects, via Query Registry or PowerShell, may also proceed malicious use.[1][6] Monitor for spawning of processes associated with COM objects, especially those invoked by a user different than the one currently logged on.

Monitor for any influxes or abnormal increases in Distributed Computing Environment/Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) traffic.

References

  1. Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.
  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.
  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  4. Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
  5. Nelson, M. (2017, November 16). Lateral Movement using Outlook's CreateObject Method and DotNetToJScript. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  6. Nelson, M. (2017, January 5). Lateral Movement using the MMC20 Application COM Object. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  7. Nelson, M. (2017, January 23). Lateral Movement via DCOM: Round 2. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  1. Nelson, M. (2017, September 11). Lateral Movement using Excel.Application and DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  2. Tsukerman, P. (2017, November 8). Leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  4. Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable or Disable DCOM. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
  5. Microsoft. (n.d.). What is Protected View?. Retrieved November 22, 2017.
  6. Mudge, R. (2017, January 24). Scripting Matt Nelson’s MMC20.Application Lateral Movement Technique. Retrieved November 21, 2017.
  7. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.