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TECHNIQUES
PRE-ATT&CK
Priority Definition Planning
Priority Definition Direction
Target Selection
Technical Information Gathering
People Information Gathering
Organizational Information Gathering
Technical Weakness Identification
People Weakness Identification
Organizational Weakness Identification
Adversary OPSEC
Establish & Maintain Infrastructure
Persona Development
Build Capabilities
Test Capabilities
Stage Capabilities
Enterprise
Initial Access
Phishing
Supply Chain Compromise
Valid Accounts
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
Inter-Process Communication
Scheduled Task/Job
System Services
User Execution
Persistence
Account Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create Account
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Office Application Startup
Pre-OS Boot
Scheduled Task/Job
Server Software Component
Traffic Signaling
Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Create or Modify System Process
Event Triggered Execution
Hijack Execution Flow
Process Injection
Scheduled Task/Job
Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Access Token Manipulation
Execution Guardrails
File and Directory Permissions Modification
Hide Artifacts
Hijack Execution Flow
Impair Defenses
Indicator Removal on Host
Masquerading
Modify Authentication Process
Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
Obfuscated Files or Information
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Signed Binary Proxy Execution
Signed Script Proxy Execution
Subvert Trust Controls
Traffic Signaling
Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Valid Accounts
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Credential Access
Brute Force
Credentials from Password Stores
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Modify Authentication Process
OS Credential Dumping
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Unsecured Credentials
Discovery
Account Discovery
Permission Groups Discovery
Software Discovery
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Lateral Movement
Remote Service Session Hijacking
Remote Services
Use Alternate Authentication Material
Collection
Archive Collected Data
Data from Information Repositories
Data Staged
Email Collection
Input Capture
Man-in-the-Middle
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol
Data Encoding
Data Obfuscation
Dynamic Resolution
Encrypted Channel
Proxy
Traffic Signaling
Web Service
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium
Exfiltration Over Web Service
Impact
Data Manipulation
Defacement
Disk Wipe
Endpoint Denial of Service
Network Denial of Service
Mobile
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Network Effects
Remote Service Effects
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  2. Techniques
  3. Enterprise
  4. Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
  5. LSASS Driver

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver

ID Name
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.002 Authentication Package
T1547.003 Time Providers
T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL
T1547.005 Security Support Provider
T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions
T1547.007 Re-opened Applications
T1547.008 LSASS Driver
T1547.009 Shortcut Modification
T1547.010 Port Monitors
T1547.011 Plist Modification

Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. [1]

Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.

ID: T1547.008
Sub-technique of:  T1547
Tactics: Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources: DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring
Contributors: Vincent Le Toux
Version: 1.0
Created: 24 January 2020
Last Modified: 25 March 2020

Procedure Examples

Name Description
Pasam

Pasam establishes by infecting the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) DLL to load a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[8]
Wingbird

Wingbird drops a malicious file (sspisrv.dll) alongside a copy of lsass.exe, which is used to register a service that loads sspisrv.dll as a driver. The payload of the malicious driver (located in its entry-point function) is executed when loaded by lsass.exe before the spoofed service becomes unstable and crashes.[6][7]

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Credential Access Protection

On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard [3] to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. [4]
Privileged Process Integrity

On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. [5] LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are digitally signed with a Microsoft signature and adhere to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process guidance.

Restrict Library Loading

Ensure safe DLL search mode is enabled HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeDllSearchMode to mitigate risk that lsass.exe loads a malicious code library. [2]

Detection

With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. [5] Also monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. [2]

Utilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility [9] to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.

References

  1. Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  3. Lich, B., Tobin, J., Hall, J. (2017, April 5). Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  4. Lich, B., Tobin, J. (2017, April 5). How Windows Defender Credential Guard works. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  5. Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  1. Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  2. Microsoft. (2017, November 9). Backdoor:Win32/Wingbird.A!dha. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
  3. Mullaney, C. & Honda, H. (2012, May 4). Trojan.Pasam. Retrieved February 22, 2018.
  4. Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.