Regulation of Unauthorized Camping, Loitering, and Solicitation of Aid

Overview

Homelessness is a complex issue. Cities and counties attempting to address it must often balance the need to provide adequate services and housing to persons experiencing homelessness with the need to reduce  negative behaviors in public spaces. This balancing requires jurisdictions to navigate legal, social, and constitutional concerns. 

This page reviews common areas of local homelessness regulation: unauthorized sitting, lying, or camping; using vehicles as habitation; soliciting aid; and loitering. The page also includes information on court decisions that impact local governments’ ability to create regulations addressing these areas.

Unauthorized Sitting, Lying, or Camping in Public Places

Many local governments have enacted ordinances to regulate or prohibit sitting, lying, or camping in public places. These ordinances have been the subject of significant legal debate and litigation, with several cases challenging the constitutionality of ordinances prohibiting these public behaviors.

Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Grants Pass, Oregon ordinances prohibiting sleeping and camping in city streets, sidewalks, alleys, or parks violated the U.S. Constitution’s 8^th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment in City of Grants Pass v. Johnson. The Supreme Court concluded that the ordinances did not violate the 8^th Amendment because: 

• the 8^th Amendment only addresses the type of punishment imposed for violations, not whether acts should be punished;
• the Grants Pass ordinances applied to prohibit certain acts regardless of whether or not a violator experienced homelessness; and
• the ordinances imposed punishments (jail time and fines) that are neither cruel nor unusual, as jurisdictions across the country regularly use them to address various types of prohibited acts.

The Grants Pass decision overrules and significantly departs from Martin v. City of Boise, the prior leading Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals decision on this subject. In contrast to Grants Pass, Martin held that ordinances prohibiting acts of public sleeping or camping are cruel and unusual punishment when localities enforce them against homeless individuals lacking available shelter as a reasonable alternative to sitting, lying, or sleeping in public locations. Martin’s holding forced local jurisdictions to tailor their enforcement practices to avoid public sleeping or camping restrictions when available shelter was lacking or insufficient. In overruling Martin, the U.S. Supreme Court criticized the case’s standards as essentially unworkable in practice for courts and many localities.

Now that the Grants Pass decision has overruled Martin, localities are free under the 8^th Amendment to adopt and enforce ordinances prohibiting sleeping and camping on public property, even if available shelter is insufficient to accommodate the homeless population.

Read more about the Supreme Court ruling in this blog.

Examples of Sit-Lie Ordinances and Codes

Several Washington jurisdictions have sit-lie laws, with some limiting the scope of the laws to certain downtown or commercial areas or times of day. Most of these laws require law enforcement to first notify individuals that the conduct is prohibited before issuing a citation. Additionally, these laws generally contain exceptions, such as those for persons confined to wheelchairs, injured persons, persons patronizing shops on private property, or persons using bus stops.

These sit-lie ordinance examples pre-date the 2024 City of Grants Pass v. Johnson decision:

• Auburn Municipal Code Ch. 10.68 – Provides clear definitions of the zones in which the practice is prohibited.
• Leavenworth Municipal Code Sec. 9.36.020 – Restricted between 8 am to 5 pm in the commercial zone districts. 
• Marysville Municipal Code Ch. 12.22 – Restricts anyone from sitting or lying down on all public sidewalks within the city limits between 6 am to 12 midnight. 
• Seattle Municipal Code Sec. 15.48.040 – Restricted within the downtown and neighborhood commercial zones between 7 am to 9 pm.
• Spokane Municipal Code Sec. 10.10.026 – Includes a map of the area affected by the regulation. Allows homeless individuals to sit or lie within the designated zone “during a time frame when shelter space is unavailable.”

Examples of Ordinances, Codes, and Procedures Regarding Encampments

In addition to ordinances prohibiting persons from sitting, lying, sleeping or camping on public property, several jurisdictions have also enacted ordinances, policies, or procedures regulating the keeping and storage of personal items on public property. These authorities often address homeless encampments, and they may provide procedures for “sweeping” encampments to remove personal items from streets, sidewalks, or other public property.

Two significant 9^th Circuit rulings restrict a locality’s ability to remove property from homeless encampments on public property. Jurisdictions should factor these rulings into their development of public encampment policies and practices:

• Lavan v. City of Los Angeles (2012) – The city’s practice of summarily removing and destroying personal items from swept public property homeless encampments violated the 4^th Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures of property and failed to meet 14^th Amendment due process requirements. The government must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before permanently depriving persons of their property.
• Garcia v. City of Los Angeles (2021) – Lavan’s principles requiring owner notice before removal and destruction of encampment property apply equally to “bulky” encampment items (such as mattresses, large furniture, or appliances).

For localities, these rulings pose unanswered questions and raise practical challenges. For example:

• How much notice must local governments give before removing or destroying encampment items? Neither decision above specifies a precise notice requirement, although a 72-hour minimum notice period has developed as a common local practice.
• How is a locality to properly and consistently distinguish between personal items subject to constitutional protection and worthless or even potentially harmful items such as junk, garbage, or hazardous waste?
• The above rulings necessarily imply that localities must keep and store personal items during the notice period until the items are either claimed or can be disposed of after the period expires. Where and how to store such items is often a challenging question for localities.

Below are several example ordinances enacted or updated by jurisdictions after the 2018 Martin v. City of Boise ruling but prior to the 2024 City of Grants Pass v. Johnson decision:

• Redmond Ordinance No. 2911 (2018) – Amends previous prohibition on camping and storage of personal property in parks and on other public property to suspend enforcement activity when shelter space is not available. Codified at RMC Chapter 9.33.
• SeaTac Ordinance No. 20-1018 (2020) – Adds a new chapter to municipal code related to unlawful camping and storage of personal property on public property. Codified at STMC Chapter 8.25.
• Sunnyside Municipal Code Sec. 9.40.050 – Prohibits unauthorized encampments and outlines removal process while Sec .070 suspends enforcement if shelter space is not available.

These documents are related to removal and/or cleanup of encampments.

• Lake Stevens Homeless Encampment Removal and Cleanup Request for Bids (2016)
• Shoreline Encampment Clean-up Protocol (2017)
• Spokane Removal and Cleanup Policy (2020)

Here are some public-facing local government webpages related to encampments.

• Seattle: Addressing Homelessness
• Tacoma: Encampment Cleanups and Site Reclamation

Use of Vehicles for Habitation

Some individuals experiencing homelessness live in vehicles. If a vehicle used for habitation becomes inoperable, local parking enforcement personnel may cite it for violating duration restrictions (remaining in the same spot for too long). If the vehicle is not moved, it becomes subject to impoundment.

The 2021 Washington Supreme Court case City of Seattle v. Long addressed whether a vehicle used as a residence is subject to RCW 6.13 homestead rights. The Long Court ruled that while municipalities may cite and impound vehicles for violating parking regulations, the forced sale of vehicles to collect unpaid impound and towing fees can violate the homestead act if the vehicle’s owner uses it for habitation. For more information and analysis, see City of Seattle v. Long: Vehicle Homestead Rights and Excessive Fines.

Solicitation of Aid

Ordinances that regulate soliciting aid have become a point of contention among municipalities throughout the country, including in Washington. This is because many restrictions on soliciting aid implicate the First Amendment because they also restrict speech. Accordingly, courts scrutinize these laws strictly, and they must be narrowly crafted to survive constitutional review. 

Many municipalities have laws that specifically restrict the solicitation of aid in the public right-of-way (such as on major roads or within a certain distance of an ATM) or during certain times of day. Localities defend these laws on the grounds that they are content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions because they only restrict soliciting aid in certain places or at certain times. However, the 2015 United States Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert has changed the way courts scrutinize such laws. That case involved a challenge to the wording on signs, but its holding has been understood as applying to content-based restrictions on speech more generally. 

Out-of-State Court Decisions Regarding Solicitation

Prohibitions on soliciting aid are generally unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to the limitations on free speech. However, narrowly drafted pedestrian and vehicular interference ordinances may pass muster if they regulate conduct (blocking the right-of-way) instead of expression, as the court decisions below illustrate. 

• Brown v. City of Grand Junction (Colo. 2015) – A Colorado Federal District Court found a city ordinance that restricted soliciting aid at night, within 20 feet of an ATM or bus stop, adjacent to an outdoor patio, or within a public parking facility unconstitutional. The court ruled that the City of Grand Junction’s ordinance violated the First Amendment rights of persons who wish to solicit charity in public places by failing to justify its regulation of expression.
• Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2014) – The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the town’s sign code because it regulated signs based on their content. The court ruled that government regulations curtailing free speech must be as narrow as possible and must fulfill a “compelling government interest.” At issue was enforcement of a town ordinance that restricted signs for religious services.

Changes in Washington State with City of Lakewood v. Willis

In 2016, the Washington Supreme Court signaled a shift in how it would assess restrictions on soliciting in response to Reed. In City of Lakewood v. Willis, the court assessed the constitutionality of a Lakewood ordinance that prohibited soliciting aid at state highway on- and off-ramps and major arterial intersections. The court stated that Reed applies to soliciting laws and held that the Lakewood ordinance was content-based because it only applied to soliciting aid but not to other types of speech.

In reaching this conclusion the court highlighted several other decisions striking down laws that regulate the solicitation of aid. This is noteworthy because those cases address soliciting restrictions that are more broadly applicable than the regulation in Willis. 

While the Willis decision only explicitly addressed restrictions on soliciting next to a highway off- or on-ramp and next to arterial roads, its reach is broader. Laws that prohibit soliciting in specific locations or at certain times are likely to come under strict scrutiny under Willis.

Examples of Pedestrian and Vehicular Interference Codes, Post Willis

In response to City of Lakewood v. Willis, some jurisdictions repealed their solicitation ordinances, including the samples listed below:

• Olympia Municipal Code 9.16.180 – Amended in 2017 to remove prohibition on solicitation but it retains pedestrian and vehicular interference provisions.
• Auburn Ordinance 6784 (2020) – Repeals “aggressive begging” provisions in Auburn Municipal Code Title 9. 

Other offenses addressing similar concerns without free speech implications include disorderly conduct, harassment, and assault

Pedestrian and Vehicular Interference

Some jurisdictions have adopted narrowly focused laws that identify and prohibit interference with vehicles and pedestrians in the public right-of-way. Since these ordinances regulate conduct instead of expression, they are not as constitutionally problematic as prohibitions on soliciting aid. However, jurisdictions should remove or avoid “aggressive begging” or “aggressive solicitation" provisions in these ordinances, as they may be interpreted to focus on speech and not conduct.

Examples of Pedestrian and Vehicular Interference Codes

• DuPont Municipal Code Sec. 9.17.030 – Defines obstructing pedestrian or vehicular traffic as walking, standing, sitting, laying, or placing an object in such a manner as to block passage by another person or driver of a vehicle or to cause another person or driver of a vehicle to take evasive action to avoid physical contact. 
• Normandy Park Municipal Code Ch. 10.34 – Prohibits pedestrian interference with vehicles on roadways and interference with vehicle sight distance.
• Sumner Municipal Code Ch. 9.48 – Prohibits intentional interruption or obstruction of pedestrian or vehicular traffic by walking, standing, sitting, laying, or placing an object in such a manner as to block passage.

Loitering

Like solicitation ordinances, courts have found general loitering ordinances to be either too vague or overbroad, in violation of constitutional protections. However, courts have upheld ordinances that ban loitering in relation to other illegal activities (such as drug activity or prostitution) when the ordinances sufficiently describe additional conditions that make the loitering illegal.

Washington Court Decisions Regarding Loitering

• City of Spokane v. Neff (2004) – Found that an ordinance prohibiting loitering by a “known prostitute” is void for vagueness when it does not define the term. 
• Seattle v. Slack (1989) – Found that an ordinance prohibiting loitering by a “known prostitute” is constitutional when the term is defined and when the ordinance requires criminal intent (in addition to loitering).
• Seattle v. Drew (1967) – Challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance that made it a crime for any person wandering or loitering abroad, or abroad under suspicious circumstances at night, to fail to give a satisfactory account of their person upon the demand of any police officer. The state Supreme Court found the ordinance too vague and overbroad because the ordinances contained nothing enabling persons “to know the dividing line between innocent loitering (for example, window shopping) and criminal loitering.”  The ordinances therefore violated state and federal constitutional protections.

MRSC Recommended Resources

Publications

• Homelessness and Housing Toolkit for Cities — A collaboration between MRSC and the Association of Washington Cities (AWC).

Blogs

Below are links to blogs written by MRSC staff and contributors.

• Blogs about homelessness
• Blogs about housing

Related Topic Pages

• Homelessness Shelter and Housing Options – Provides guidance for local governments on potential shelter and housing options for people experiencing homelessness.
• Affordable Housing – A series of webpages related to affordable housing, including incentives and types, and funding sources.