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Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024)

Chapter: Appendix G: Threats Manifested Case Studies

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Suggested Citation:"Appendix G: Threats Manifested Case Studies." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/27159.
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Page 172
Suggested Citation:"Appendix G: Threats Manifested Case Studies." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/27159.
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Page 173
Suggested Citation:"Appendix G: Threats Manifested Case Studies." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/27159.
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Page 174

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Appendix G Threats Manifested Case Studies This review of domestic threats of terrorism using chemical materials highlights some cases in which the IC and law enforcement were able to interdict terrorism threats before they could be conducted. However, in the majority of the incidents reviewed here, a detailed account of how the threat was initially identified was not publicly available. When the mode of threat identification could be discerned, a combination of informants, perpetrator incompetence, state and local law enforcement, and multiple federal agencies (notably the Secret Service, Customs) acting together with the FBI were involved. In some instances, threat identification points to a high level of expertise, coordination, and efficiency; in other cases, some degree of luck and fortuitous happenstance were involved. These considerations illustrate the reality that the ‘identify’ task is necessarily not systematic, which indicates the need for an agile, robust communication structure. Furthermore, not all threats have been interdicted, an observation substantiated by the cases described here and some State-based targeted assassination attempts such as the Skripal poisoning (see Appendix E). Joseph Loris A threat not identified prior to an attack being carried out was perpetrated by Joseph Loris in 2014, who attacked the Social Security Building in Santa Cruz, CA (Santa Cruz Police Department Blog, 2014). He poured ammonia and Clorox bleach into the building, which mixed to create chloramine gas. It is not clear that Loris meant to produce a gas. Loris was homeless and possibly suffering from mental illness. After the attack, Loris was identified and apprehended by Santa Cruz Police Detectives, with assistance from the FBI. The episode illustrates the impossibility of identifying all threats before they are carried out and some of the risks inherent in household materials. World Trade Center Bombing The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City was an event in which the threat was not identified before the attack was carried out, but the event does not qualify as a chemical attack either. A group of five members of al-Qa’ida, led by Ramzi Yousef, drove a van containing a bomb into a parking garage under the WTC and detonated it (Parachini, 2000). Six people were killed, and more than 1,000 were injured. The attack was not a chemical attack, however, Yousef “seriously considered employing chemical agents” in the WTC bombing. The perpetrators had procured a small quantity of sodium cyanide. The FBI apprehended all of the perpetrators except Yousef, who was eventually caught by Philippine police nearly two years after the attack. REFERENCES Parachini, J. V. 2000. The World Trade Center Bombers (1993), in Tucker, Jonathan B., Toxic Terror. Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000. p. 185-206. Prepublication Copy 172

Appendix G Santa Cruz Police Department Blog. 2014. Arrest Made in Chemical Attack on Social Security Office”, May 20, 2014. http://santacruzpolice.blogspot.com/2014/05/arrest-made-in- chemical-attack-on.html. Prepublication Copy 173

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Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation’s highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

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