Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024)

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5 Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism Summary of Key Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations CONCLUSION 5-1: Upon reviewing the unclassified strategies, considering USG efforts to dissuade adversaries from pursuing chemical terrorism, there are opportunities to enhance deterrence. RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The National Security Council should give careful consideration to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing counter-weapons of mass destruction terrorism strategies. FINDING 5-2: There is no evidence of a strategic communications effort that would leverage existing preventive and mitigating measures against chemical terrorism for use as part of a policy of deterrence by denial. FINDING 5-3: Despite ongoing industry practice and some initiatives that previously operated under DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, the strategy documents that were made available to the Committee do not cite chemical substitution as a key part of an overall chemical security strategy. RECOMMENDATION 5-3: Substitution of safer alternative chemicals for hazardous chemicals in industrial and academic settings should be included as part of the overall strategy. The planning and development of these strategies should be spearheaded by DHS’s Chemical Information Sharing and Analysis Center under a reauthorized Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program and should continue to be conducted in conjunction with regulatory agencies, specifically, the EPA, OSHA, as well as representatives from industry and academic research environments. FINDING 5-4a: The strategic documents surveyed do not explicitly mention insider threat in the chemical terrorism context. FINDING 5-4b: While CFATS included some practical efforts to counter insider threats within the chemical industry, the scope of these efforts appeared to be limited and the committee did not find evidence of a similar systematic program either directed towards government facilities or within academic research institutions. CONCLUSION 5-4: The significant potential consequences of an insider at a chemical facility conducting or assisting an attack warrants explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies to counter insider threats at any facility containing significant quantities of toxic chemicals. RECOMMENDATION 5-4: Counter-insider threat activities should be incorporated explicitly into broader counter WMD strategy. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence with other public and private partners should develop a strategy to ameliorate insider threats explicitly for the chemical domain. continued Prepublication Copy 76 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism Summary of Key Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations continued FINDING 5-5: The committee found that certain key activities that the U.S. government is appropriately undertaking were surprisingly absent from the strategy documents reviewed, including: military capabilities to provide early warning of chemical terrorism plots; law enforcement capabilities to counter chemical threats tactically; integration with broader counter- terrorism and counter-smuggling efforts; and involvement with other multilateral activities beyond the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. CONCLUSION 5-5: The committee concludes certain key activities that are undertaken in practice to prevent and counter chemical terrorism are sufficiently important to merit inclusion in strategy documents. The absence of such activities from the strategies could impact policy implementation, including budgeting, program prioritization, and other consequences. Including these activities in existing strategies would bolster the comprehensiveness, and therefore effectiveness, of existing strategies. RECOMMENDATION 5-5: Agencies should work to reconcile operational practice with policy by supplementing extant strategies to include current omitted effective activities and programs for countering chemical terrorism. This would ensure that effective practices are maintained, properly resourced, and reflected in comprehensive strategies. The committee surveyed the following strategy documents listed in Box 5-1. All of these documents contained useful information related to aspects of preventing and countering chemical terrorism. BOX 5-1 Strategy Documents Reviewed by Committee for “Prevent/Counter” Analysis 1. White House. (2018) National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism. 2. Department of Homeland Security. (2019) Department of Homeland Chemical Defense Strategy. 3. Department of Defense Directive 2060.02. (2017) DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy. 4. Department of Defense. (2014) Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 5. Joint-Publication 3-40. (2021) Joint Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. NOTE: At the time of writing this report, the DoD released the 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; the committee did not evaluate this document. 5.1 ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES TO “PREVENT OR COUNTER” CHEMICAL TERRORISM THREATS Most of the strategy documents espoused a coherent strategy or set of strategy elements comprising a combination of a well-defined goal with a corresponding definition of success, as well as at least one policy, plan, and/or resource allocation designed to meet the goal. The exception to this assessment was a DoD Directive 2060.02, which did not provide clear definitions of success for its goals of “dissuade, deter, and defeat actors concern and their Prepublication Copy 77 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies network;” “manage WMD terrorism risks from hostile, fragile or failed states and safe havens;” or “limit the availability of WMD-related capabilities.” There have also been more recent strategic documents that touch on chemical terrorism not available to the Committee. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) issued classified documents describing the U.S. government’s internal organization and policies on actions to prevent, counter, and respond to WMD terrorism. The most recent is the National Security Memorandum (NSM) 19 to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Material Security. Although NSM-19 is classified, government officials have released some information about it (The White House, 2023) and have given an unclassified briefing on its contents, which are meant to address what the administration sees as the changing features of the terrorist threat. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall issued a statement at a Nuclear Threat Initiative event on March 2, 2023: “It [the terrorist threat] has become more ideologically diffuse and geographically diverse.” Much of the presentation focused on nuclear terrorism, however, chemical terrorism was referenced: “threats that are not existential, but more likely, such as chemical and radiological terrorism” (Sherwood-Randall, 2023). As explained in Section 5.1.1, the committee evaluates the adequacy of strategies by whether they contain certain elements and features. Most of the strategy elements that the committee believes are essential to address both the current and emerging threat of chemical terrorism are reflected in the above-mentioned strategy documents. The method described in Chapter 3 lists these elements and whether each one is addressed by the strategies. 5.1.1 Committee’s Definition of Adequacy: Prevent or Counter The committee argues that a successful strategy to prevent or counter chemical terrorism focuses on the following elements: • Incorporates developments in the “Identify” area into practice for “Prevent and Counter”. • Dissuades terrorists through deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, or through normative means. • Impedes acquisition of raw materials, production technology, delivery technology, or information for production or delivery. Strategy also demonstrates having mechanisms (e.g. insider threat programs, strategic trade controls, international efforts, collaboration with other counterterrorism programs) to ensure those items are not acquired. • Interdicts active plots through military, law enforcement, or intelligence capabilities. • Ensures collaboration at various levels—international, federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT). • Addresses new chemical terrorism threats: new chemical agents, new production or delivery methods and technologies, and new actors. • Forms collaboration with non-terrorist focused agencies (e.g., Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA]). The committee’s analysis considered all six of these major elements. Successful “prevent/counter” strategies focus on communicating clearly which adversaries they will prevent and counter from committing acts of chemical terrorism (often described in the documents’ Prepublication Copy 78 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism “goals” and “objectives”) and lay a clear plan for how the respective agencies will ensure that their goals are met. 5.1.2 Countering Identified Threats The FBI looks at all actors (state, non-state, and lone), all modalities, and all stages from pre-event to post-event. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) has programs for preparedness, countermeasures, investigations and operations, and intelligence (coordinated with the FBI Intelligence Branch) (Savage, 2022). The WMD Intelligence Analysis Section focuses on proliferation threats from state actors and counterterrorism activity concerning non-state actors such as Al Qaida, al Shabab, and others. The CBRN Intelligence Unit in the FBI’s Intelligence Branch includes technical experts who focus on threats and vulnerabilities of the materials themselves. They will investigate “any actor acquiring or seeking to acquire chemical, chemical expertise, related or emerging technologies for use, threatened use, or attempted use as a weapon” (McNelis, 2022). The Chemical Biological Countermeasures Unit works to prevent (detect, deter, and disrupt) WMD attacks, with a major focus on outreach. They conduct outreach through the Chemical Industry Outreach Workshop,1 Livewire Exercises,2 the Chemical Facility Outreach Program,3 WMD coordinators in field offices, and partnerships with other government agencies such as former CFATS and Flashpoint,4 implemented by the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). There are 56 WMD coordinators, one in each of the 56 FBI field offices, and there are FBI WMD specialists present in 90 countries. WMD coordinators are FBI special agents who work with partners in other law enforcement organizations and the private sector. They are trained in CBRNE investigations and promote two-way information-sharing. They are supported by 300 assistant coordinators. The CBCU also works to protect advances in scientific research and technology development from theft and misuse (Sharp, 2022). The FBI has a bi-annual threat review process where they rank threats and a program within the bureau tracks how well each field office is doing to mitigate threats based on their prioritization. This helps in evaluating effectiveness and prioritizing among the various programs. The FBI WMDD has within its scope chemical (warfare agents to industrial and household chemicals), biological (pathogens and toxins), radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats (CBRNE). As a result, in addition to addressing the traditionally understood WMD threats, the WMDD CBCU works to prevent and protect against the use of explosives, with the intention to raise awareness with vendors selling explosive precursor chemicals (EPCs) and providing information on “who to contact” if suspicious purchases are occurring. Capabilities for countering CWMD within the FBI require significant intellectual resources. Attracting personnel with the ability to address the technological issues derived from a 1 A workshop to educate law enforcement, first responders, chemical manufacturers, retailers, distributors, and academia regarding explosive precursor chemical products that may be used to manufacture explosives. 2 Livewire is a tabletop exercise of response to a chemical terrorist attack. People from all organizations involved in the response come to the table to exercise a response. 3 A regional workshop to engage chemical facilities that manufacture, store, use, transport or distribute chemicals of interest on threat-related issues. 4 Flashpoint’s goal is to raise awareness within stores selling precursor chemicals. Prepublication Copy 79 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies chemical terrorism event is a challenge for the FBI (Savage, 2022). They are able to mitigate this problem to some extent by contracting needed expertise from organizations outside the FBI, and by forming partnerships with sister organizations, but there are areas where more personnel are needed. One area in particular need of augmented personnel is data science. The FBI has had the same staffing level for the past 17 years, and in some areas, like data science, would benefit from increased staffing levels. 5.1.3 Deterrence or Reducing Motivation Upon reviewing existing strategy documents, the committee found references to deterrence by punishment in a non-specific context. For example, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (p3) reiterates the declaratory policy that “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including through resort to all of our options—to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies… posing the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such weapons.” The overall document explicitly cites terrorists as a source of potential risk in the context of the acquisition and use of WMD, but they are not explicitly called out in the context of deterrence. Strategies addressing non-state actors appear to be focused predominantly on other forms of deterrence, which could involve threatening to punish potential states, non-state institutions, and even individuals who might support terrorists acquiring WMD (including chemical weapons). The committee found no explicit declaratory statement of direct deterrence by punishment directed toward terrorists who used chemical weapons, in contrast to both the nuclear and biological domains. Deterrence of chemical terrorism is also different in that the United States has, in the past, responded to actionable intelligence indicating a terrorist group was attempting to obtain chemical weapons with pre-emptive strikes (Croddy, 2002). As discussed in Box 5-2, direct deterrence of terrorists, while not straightforward, is possible. Moreover, there are substantial advantages to an explicit communication of the direct deterrence proposition (e.g., that the United States will take certain measures if terrorists utilize chemical weapons that would not otherwise be taken). This is because, in order for deterrence to work at all, the deterrence proposition needs to be conveyed effectively to the targets of the deterrence. For states, this can be done publicly through pronouncements, privately through diplomatic and other channels, or implicitly through exhibited capabilities or actions. However, in the case of terrorists, which represent a diffuse set of actors scattered around the world with whom the United States rarely has formal (or even informal) relations, the efficacy of private channels is likely to be low at best.5 While the proposition can be conveyed implicitly and generally (e.g., if the U.S. military has conducted expanded drone strikes within terrorist safe havens in response to a previous escalation in the scale or scope of terrorist attacks), this approach might not be sufficient to deter a chemical attack specifically. This is because deterrence by punishment relies in most cases on 5 A declaratory policy does not have to be enshrined in an official executive order or national strategy. A statement in a speech by the President or the secretary of defense might be enough. Prepublication Copy 80 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism reducing the adversary’s ambiguity about the severity, celerity, and certainty of the reprisal and thus enhancing credibility. Although most terrorists would infer based on past U.S. behavior that the United States would retaliate vigorously to a large-scale chemical attack, they might not realize how vigorously or how quickly it would react.6 BOX 5-2 Background on Deterrence In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it was often suggested— including by President George W. Bush and senior members of his administration—that, unlike states, terrorists were undeterrable, both because many had no fixed addresses and because many were suicidal. There was subsequently considerable scholarly and analytic pushback against this notion, and mainstream assessments today posit that deterrence is an important part of the counterterrorism toolkit, and therefore also the counter-chemical terrorism toolkit. Deterrence is an influence strategy, trying to dissuade the other side from undertaking some action through the use of negative incentives. It most commonly refers to the use of conditional threats, where the costs threatened are intended to outweigh the benefits from the action being considered, labeled “deterrence by punishment.” More broadly, “deterrence by denial” involves denying the attainment of benefits so that the actor is dissuaded from attempting the action in the first place. Some policies may fall into both categories; for example, security guards in stores both make it more likely shoplifters will be foiled in the attempt and also that they will be punished. On the other hand, some policies fit more neatly into one category; for example, signs in stores indicating that “All shoplifters will be prosecuted” (despite the cost to the store) are a pure deterrence by punishment threat. Similarly, the actions of both targeting perpetrators and massive retaliation (reprisal using disproportionate force) after an attack demonstrate punishment, and beyond simple revenge presumably are intended to deter future attacks. In order for terrorists and their supporters to be deterrable, several conditions must apply, and all of them are so-called “necessary conditions,” meaning they must all be met. To be deterrable: 1. Terrorists or supporters must have preferences, such as having things they care about, and to varying degrees must care more about some things than other things. This is labeled either “rationality” or “minimal rationality.” 2. Those seeking to deter terrorists must be capable of affecting those preferences, which implies knowing what those preferences are. 3. Threats of denial and punishment must be credible. 4. Effective implicit and/or explicit communication must occur, such that the target both receives and understands the threat (in the case of deterrence by punishment) or the increased likelihood of not achieving their objectives (in the case of deterrence by denial). Or the government may genuinely have few options for escalation: if the government already has maximal campaigns against certain groups or individuals then they cannot be increased. And no approach to deterrence works in all cases. In practice, presumably, some terrorists are not deterrable, but many are, and their supporters are even more so. continued 6 Ambiguity about what scale of chemical use would trigger punishment is valuable. Establishing clear thresholds or red lines leads adversaries to approach those thresholds without exceeding them. Prepublication Copy 81 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies BOX 5-2 continued While there have been lively debates about whether terrorists are deterrable, there is a widespread consensus that potential state sponsors are deterrable. Relatedly, there have been debates about what some have termed “deterrence of negligence,” with a focus on nuclear terrorism threats, though the same arguments are potentially applicable to chemical terrorism. The argument is that if states are lax in controlling materials or weapons, leading them to fall into the hands of terrorists, those states should be held accountable for the consequences of their actions. While states might perceive implicit versions of the threat, the argument is sometimes made that the threat would be more effective if it were articulated explicitly, perhaps publicly, perhaps via private channels. Criminal justice literature suggests that deterrence by punishment effects vary based on the likelihood, severity, and celerity (e.g., speed of punishment). It is intuitive that the likelihood of facing punishment and the severity of punishment is important, and less intuitive than celerity (i.e., the time it takes for the punishment to be imposed) should also be important. The implicit and explicit threats that undergird deterrence by punishment may backfire under some circumstances. Some actors may be less concerned about or even welcome harsh responses. For example, some argue that Al Qaeda welcomed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Far-right extremists might welcome a harsh crackdown by government authorities, thinking it will generate sympathy and support for their cause or spark an uprising. Separately, albeit relatedly, some actors may also welcome the opportunity to send so-called “costly signals” to various audiences, and making them more costly may therefore induce rather than deter action. For example, terrorists might assess that if they are seen as boldly taking on the powerful U.S. government, despite the backlash they are risking, that will bolster their recruitment efforts. Threatening a more intense backlash might only intensify these motivations. Alternately, terrorists might calculate that if they are seen as successfully attacking a particularly well-defended target, that will redound to their benefit. One possible reason for not explicitly communicating a direct deterrence proposition (e.g. drawing a red line) is that it can tie the hands of the USG because once a threat is made, it must be followed through on, or further deterrence is undermined. It is arguable that the failure of the Obama Administration to respond forcefully when Syria crossed the President’s stated “red line” by using chemical weapons against its people undermined U.S. chemical weapons deterrence vis-a-vis states, and policymakers may be reluctant to repeat this episode in the terrorism context. There are classified EOP policy and guidance documents relating to deterrence of chemical weapons use worldwide, including both state and non-state threats. When the committee asked why public versions of these policies to address chemical terrorism threats have not been issued (given that there are such documents for nuclear and biological threats) and that existing strategies do not mention direct deterrence of terrorists, the EOP replied that the classified documents provide what the White House needs from them—mostly direction for internal policy and organization. The nuclear and biological threats are addressed in separate major strategy documents, the nuclear posture review and the biodefense strategy, for example. No such document is required by law for chemical threats. Further explanations were not provided to the committee, nor is there any evidence that direct deterrence (at least explicitly conveyed) is a major part of current strategies, either in the classified or unclassified realm. That said, officials informed the committee that the United States’ position concerning chemical weapons and chemical terrorism is conveyed through other means such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) compliance reports, support for the Organization for the Prepublication Copy 82 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the 1540 committee, and other actions. The implication appears to be that through multiple means the USG conveys that it seeks to, and demonstrates that it does, hold responsible for its actions anyone who commits a terrorist attacks against the United States, including chemical attacks. The Committee argues, however, that U.S. statements through international bodies such as the OPCW or the 1540 Committee, while potentially useful in indicating U.S. positions to other states, are unlikely to constitute sufficient explicit conveyance of a deterrence proposition regarding chemical attack to terrorist actors. The committee judges that careful consideration should be given to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing counter-WMD terrorism strategies. More assessment may be needed to determine: a) whether the direct deterrence by punishment strategy needs to be communicated explicitly for chemical terrorism, or b) whether implicit, more generalized threats that can be inferred by terrorists might suffice to accomplish most of the deterrence that can be achieved. Such a study would also include discussions on the strategic and operational implications of issuing an official document versus including a declaration in a national security speech or via another channel. CONCLUSION 5-1: Upon reviewing the unclassified strategies, considering USG efforts to dissuade adversaries from pursuing chemical terrorism, there are opportunities to enhance deterrence. RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The National Security Council should give careful consideration to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing counter-weapons of mass destruction terrorism strategies. 5.1.3a Deterrence by Denial The committee found multiple existing policies and programs that contribute to a strategy of deterrence by denial. These include facility security improvements under CFATS7 and a variety of response capabilities (see Chapter 6) that would mitigate the harm caused by a chemical attack. For maximum deterrence effects to be achieved, it is, therefore, valuable to craft and implement a specific communications strategy conveying the efficacy of defensive capabilities8 to convince would-be adversaries that they will not achieve the goals they seek from using chemicals. The amount, content, and channels associated with such a communications effort require careful consideration and crafting. On the one hand, leveraging deterrence by denial for chemical attacks depends on informing terrorists why their plots are unlikely to succeed, which means that some information about defensive measures must be released if we want to dissuade them from trying in the first place. On the other hand, providing too much detail about defenses and response capabilities could potentially aid terrorists in circumventing those same defenses. More study is needed beyond the scope of the committee. Yet, irrespective of the specific nature of any communications meant to enhance deterrence by denial, the committee could find no evidence of a dedicated communications 7 At the time of writing this report, the statutory authority for the CFATS program (6 CFR Part 27) expired and has yet to be reauthorized. 8 There is the possibility of intentionally mischaracterizing this effectiveness, for example exaggerating the ability to detect or treat chemical use to enhance the deterrent effect, and this carries risks of undermining deterrence when the mischaracterization is discovered. Prepublication Copy 83 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies strategy or policies to this effect in any of the strategic documents or other materials it reviewed. The committee understands that it is inadvisable to disclose all security measures that exist to prevent or mitigate chemical terrorism. Nonetheless, since the United States is already engaging in these activities, and some of them are already known publicly (albeit in relatively arcane circles) the United States could leverage its achievements in these areas as part of a deliberate strategic communications effort to enhance deterrence by denial. For example, there is no explicit reference in public strategy documents to improving the robustness or lowering the vulnerability of civilian populations and targets in general to chemical attack, even though there are numerous programs that are doing just this. Such a strategic communications effort could be coordinated and implemented by CISA domestically and the State Department’s Global Engagement Center and Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation abroad, working with the NSC. FINDING 5-2: There is no evidence of a strategic communications effort that would leverage existing preventive and mitigating measures against chemical terrorism for use as part of a policy of deterrence by denial. 5.1.4 Reducing Material Availability Some chemicals are readily accessible, others far less so, with a spectrum from extremely accessible (e.g., commercially available household chemicals), relatively accessible (e.g., many so-called toxic industrial chemicals or TICs present in chemical plants and manufacturing facilities), to extremely inaccessible (e.g., organophosphate nerve agents and many of their key precursor chemicals). In theory, any chemical can be produced from readily available precursor chemicals. In practice, the technical barriers to producing certain chemicals are high, in some cases extremely high. Many policy practitioners and the general public seem not to appreciate the notable challenges associated with organophosphate nerve agent synthesis, even if key precursor chemicals are obtained, for example (Kaszeta, 2018). Accessibility is shaped to a large extent by the domestic legal and regulatory structure, which is in turn influenced by international law and efforts at export control harmonization via multilateral export control regimes, as well as private sector controls independent of/in addition to legal and regulatory requirements. The United States also helps other countries bolster their controls, as part of a broader international architecture put in place to try to identify and ameliorate the weakest links in an international chain of chemical supply and production that potentially can put everyone at risk. Regulatory efforts to reduce material availability (domestic & international) Domestically, Executive Order 13650 on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, issued on August 1, 2013 (Exec. Order, 2013) directed the federal government to: • improve operational coordination with state and local partners; enhance Federal agency coordination and information-sharing ; modernize policies, regulations, and standards; and work with stakeholders to identify best practices. Prepublication Copy 84 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism The order established the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working group, co-led by DHS, OSHA, and EPA working with ATF, DOT, USDA, SLTT governments, first responders, industry, and community stakeholders. Table 5-1 lists the federal agencies and their respective programs that are involved in countering chemical terrorism. Under this executive order, U.S. EPA established the Risk Management Program regulation, which aims to “reduce the likelihood of accidental releases at chemical facilities, and to improve emergency response activities when those releases occur” (Exec. Order, 2018). DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) established Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Chemical substitution programs at EPA and former CFATS programs are further discussed in Section 5.1.4a “Chemical Substitution”. Additional information regarding CFAT’s authorization expiration can be found in Section 7.5. TABLE 5-1 Key Players and Roles in “Prevent/Counter” Federal Agency Programs Description Department of − Office of Infrastructure Protection OIP oversees critical infrastructure protection, Homeland Security (OIP) including chemical facilities. (DHS) − Office of Intelligence and Analysis I&A provides intelligence support and threat (I&A) assessments related to chemical terrorism. − Office of Bombing Prevention (OBP) − Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism OBP focuses on preventing and responding to Standards (CFATS)* explosive threats involving chemical components. CFATS ensured the security of high-risk chemical facilities by implementing risk-based performance standards and regulations. Department of Justice − Weapons of Mass Destruction FBI investigates and disrupts chemical (DOJ) and Federal Directorate (WMDD) terrorism threats and attacks, working in Bureau of − Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms coordination with other agencies. More Investigation (FBI) and Explosives (ATF) specifically, WMDD investigates and disrupts chemical terrorism threats, including the use of chemical weapons or agents. ATF addresses the illegal use, acquisition, and trafficking of chemicals, including those that can be used for terrorism. Environmental − Chemical Emergency Preparedness CEPPO implements the Risk Management Protection Agency and Prevention Office (CEPPO) Program (RMP) to prevent and prepare for (EPA) − Criminal Investigation Division chemical accidents and incidents with potential terrorism implications. The Criminal Investigation Division investigates violations of environmental laws related to chemicals, including those with potential terrorism connections. Department of − Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA develops and deploys advanced Defense (DoD) (DTRA detection and response capabilities to counter − Chemical and Biological Defense chemical and biological threats, including Program (CBDP) terrorism. CBDP works to protect military personnel and the nation against chemical threats, including those from terrorist activities. continued Prepublication Copy 85 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies TABLE 5-1 continued Federal Agency Programs Description Department of State − International Security and State is the USG’s primary interface for (State) Nonproliferation Bureau (ISN) interactions with other nations and with − Office of Cooperative Threat international organizations. In addition to Reduction (CTR) leading diplomacy and having a role in policy, − Export Control and Border Security State has several implementation programs for Program (EXBS) everything from identification and prevention − Office of Counterterrorism (CT) through consequence management under − Office of Export Control Cooperation several offices, including CTR, ECC, CT, and (ECC) others. − Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs (MNSA) − Office of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) − Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMD/T) Department of Health − Office of the Assistant Secretary for ASPR coordinates medical and public health and Human Services Preparedness and Response (ASPR) emergency preparedness and response efforts, (HHS) − Centers for Disease Control and including those related to chemical terrorism. Prevention (CDC) CDC conducts research, surveillance, and response activities related to chemical threats and public health impacts. Department of Energy − National Nuclear Security NNSA works to prevent, detect, and respond to (DOE) Administration (NNSA) radiological and nuclear threats, including those involving chemical agents. Department of − Animal and Plant Health Inspection APHIS protects agricultural and natural Agriculture (USDA) Service (APHIS) resources from potential chemical threats, including agro-terrorism. Department of − Pipeline and Hazardous Materials PHMSA regulates the safe transportation of Transportation (DOT) Safety Administration (PHMSA) hazardous materials, including chemicals, to prevent incidents and potential terrorist exploitation. Food and Drug − Center for Drug Evaluation and CDER ensures the safety and security of Administration (FDA) Research (CDER) pharmaceuticals, including controlled substances used in the treatment of opioid addiction. NOTE: At the time of writing this report, CFATS statutory authority expired. Internationally, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC “restricts the production of many ‘dual-use’ chemicals, such as those that could be used both in the illegal production of chemical weapons and for peaceful chemical processes.” (OPCW, n.d.)9 To prevent dual-use chemicals from being misused, States Parties to the CWC have committed to 9 There is a nuance here. If the chemicals are used for peaceful/allowed purposes under the CWC, the production is not so much restricted as it is monitored and verified to be used for the declared purpose. The CWC allow chemical warfare agents to be produced and possessed when they are being used for research purposes to counter chemical agents (e.g., analysis methods, PPE and countermeasure development and testing, etc.). Additionally, CWC Schedule III chemicals be produced in large quantities. Prepublication Copy 86 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism ensure that “all toxic chemicals, and their precursors, are only used for purposes that are not prohibited by the Convention.” The signator declares quantities and types of chemicals and submits the declarations regarding these chemicals. OPCW inspects “the facilities where these chemicals are produced, processed, or consumed to ensure that the declarations are complete and accurate.” Also, when they export or import scheduled chemicals, States Parties to the Convention are obliged to declare international transfers between States Parties and are prohibited from trade in certain chemicals with non-States Parties (OPCW, n.d.). The CWC also requires its States Parties to put in place “controls, where considered necessary, on scheduled or non-scheduled chemicals that are susceptible to being used as weapons or in the manufacture of chemical weapons.” [Ibid] This includes physical protections and regulatory requirements. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) (UNSC, 2004) which obliges states to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” It goes on to declare that states need to adopt and enforce laws prohibiting the WMD-related actions listed above, establish appropriate controls over related materials, including accounting for and securing items and materials and develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit trafficking of materials and items related to WMD. The help implement UNSCR 1540, the resolution established the 1540 Committee. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by the United States in 2003, is a cooperative international effort “to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.” One hundred and six countries have signed on to PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, committing to “interdict transfers to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities.” They also commit to exchange information and “take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts” (DOS, 2003). The chemical weapons-relevant Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs (CTR) are situated in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the State Department’s International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau (ISN) (Becker and Nalabandian, 2022). The original objective of CTR was to work with former Soviet states to destroy weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. The scope of CTR has expanded to include work with other cooperative states to reduce the chemical threat, including both terrorism and state-level activities.10 Most of DTRA’s CTR activities are focused on the elimination of known stockpiles of chemical warfare agents. This reduces the probability of a terrorist chemical terrorism event by reducing the overseas availability of chemical warfare agents and their precursor chemicals, know-your-customer programs for businesses, and a variety of other activities and training or capacity-building programs that parallel domestic programs. Because of the possibility that precursor chemicals could be transported to a VEO, CTR programs also are taking a more active interest in chemical transportation security. As stated in the name, the programs are cooperative, working with other nations and international organizations (International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United 10 See 2009 Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction; 2018 Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs for the Next Ten Years and Beyond Proceedings of a Symposium—in Brief; 2020 A Strategic Vision for Biological Threat Reduction: The U.S. Department of Defense and Beyond. Prepublication Copy 87 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and others) on shared priorities. In some cases, non-cooperative regimes change (e.g., Libya) creating significant risks and opportunities. Together with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (described in Chapter 7), CTR programs can secure and eliminate stockpiles before they fall into the hands of VEOs. The network of experts in and associated with the CTR program and their partners is a resource to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks quickly when they arise. At the same time, it is difficult for under-resourced partner countries to sustain the capabilities that CTR has provided. Maintaining knowledgeable staff, both in the United States and in partner countries, is also a challenge. 5.1.4a Chemical Substitution Another key avenue by which the risk of chemical terrorism threats can be reduced is to replace existing processes and materials with less toxic alternatives, often referred to as inherently safer technology (IST). This chemical substitution reduces the potential consequences of a chemical terrorist attack by making toxic materials less prevalent or by eliminating their use entirely, making theft and use of the materials in commerce more difficult and less attractive and making the facilities less attractive targets for sabotage (see above discussion of deterrence by denial). While terrorism threat would be lowered, a large-scale chemical release will still cause disruption even though the toxicity is low (e.g., time for clean-up, environmental impact, and other disruptions). Chemical substitution and IST are not a new idea. Occupational and environmental safety concerns have long driven industry to seek substitution as a strategy to mitigate hazards, and both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and EPA EPA have for decades encouraged and recognized innovative approaches for substitution,11 with a number of programs and offices playing a role.12 Indeed, OSHA provides a graphic on its website (see Figure 5-1 below) emphasizing that reduction/elimination of hazardous substances is the most effective risk-reduction mechanism (OSHA, n.d.). Similarly, the EPA has, as part of its Risk Management Program (RMP), for a long time collaborated with industry and academia to encourage substitution as part of a transition to “Green Chemistry”.13 For example, since 1996, the EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention has sponsored the Green Chemistry Challenge Awards in partnership with the American Chemical Society’s Green Chemistry Institute® and other members of the chemical industry.14 Yet, safety and security⎯while overlapping to some degree⎯have different 11 On its website https://www.osha.gov/safer-chemicals, OSHA notes that “Where possible, elimination or substitution is the most desirable followed by engineering controls”. 12 Examples include EPA’s Chemical Safety and Sustainability Research Program, the Center for Public Health and Environmental Assessment and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 13 Green Chemistry is defined by the EPA as: “the design of chemical products and processes that reduce or eliminate the use or generation of hazardous substances. Green chemistry applies across the life cycle of a chemical product, including its design, manufacture, use, and ultimate disposal.” It further states that “Green chemistry reduces pollution at its source by minimizing or eliminating the hazards of chemical feedstock’s, reagents, solvents, and products.” [https://www.epa.gov/greenchemistry/basics-green- chemistry] 14 The EPA website notes that “through 2022, our 133 winning technologies have made billions of pounds of progress, including…830 million pounds of hazardous chemicals and solvents eliminated each year— Prepublication Copy 88 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism aims, and intentional harm can manifest in very different ways from accidental or environmental harm. Neither the EPA nor the OSHA programs are focused on security. For example, they do not include theft or diversion as considerations for decisions regarding substitution. Other security risks involving chemical substitution also include the possibility of the less harmful chemicals being used as precursors to synthesize more toxic chemicals. FIGURE 5.1 OSHA Chemical Risk Reduction Pyramid. DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program did implicitly encourage chemical substitution and lowering inventories of toxic chemicals, since facilities with less toxic chemicals have lower reporting and security requirements. Even though the chemical industry has vigorously opposed any mandatory IST as part of the CFATS program,15 a productive partnership was developed between CFATS and industry regarding voluntary chemical substitution efforts, with substantial reductions in the usage of hazardous chemicals (Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, 2018). These partnerships likely translated into an overall reduction in risk. Yet, these laudable efforts by CFATS and industry are not embodied in any larger government strategy—none of the strategy documents reviewed by the Committee mention IST or chemical substitution as a distinct goal or strategy. Absent a coherent strategy, innovations that might enhance or facilitate existing practice may not be resourced or encouraged. For example, making substitution an explicit part of the government’s strategy could allow for such measures as direct incentive policies for industry to enough to fill almost 3,800 railroad tank cars or a train nearly 47 miles long” [https://www.epa.gov/ greenchemistry/information-about-green-chemistry-challenge. 15 When IST requirements were included in the House version of the 2009 CFATS bill, both the American Chemistry Council and the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates came out in opposition, arguing that the concept of IST was nebulous and that DHS lacked the capacity to understand all of the downstream effects of a particular mandate on industry supply chains, which could lead to disruption and shortages of important products. Mandatory IST was not included in the final statute. See: https://www.pharmtech.com/view/house-committee-passes-ist-requirements-chemical-facility-security- bill. Prepublication Copy 89 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies substitute less toxic chemicals or processes, as well as encouraging research into which substitutions would have the greatest security, in addition to safety and environmental, benefits. As a comparable case study in a related domain, replacing certain dangerous radioisotopes in industry, medicine and research is a strategic goal of the DOE / NNSA, embodied in the Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (Lieberman and Itamura, n.d.). While this project covers only a limited number of hazardous substances and there are far fewer facilities housing dangerous radioisotopes than dangerous chemicals, such programs can serve as a model for how a coherent substitution strategy can lead to tangible security improvements. Note that the committee does not seek to prescribe any particular policy in this regard. There could be a variety of mechanisms for implementing the strategy, ranging from voluntary to mandatory, and from top-down to bottom-up approaches. The committee leaves the precise contours of a policy for the appropriate parties to develop, preferably in a collaborative fashion, but merely recommends that there should exist a strategy related to chemical substitution, with defined goals and stakeholders. FINDING 5-3: Despite ongoing industry practice and some initiatives that previously operated under DHS’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, the strategy documents that were made available to the Committee do not cite chemical substitution as a key part of an overall chemical security strategy. RECOMMENDATION 5-3: Substitution of safer alternative chemicals for hazardous chemicals in industrial and academic settings should be included as part of the overall strategy. The planning and development of these strategies should be spearheaded by DHS’s Chemical Information Sharing and Analysis Center under a reauthorized Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards16 and should continue to be conducted in conjunction with regulatory agencies, specifically, the EPA, OSHA, as well as representatives from industry and academic research environments. 5.1.4b Insider Threat Given the nature of insiders’ privileged access to and knowledge of a facility’s systems, an insider with malicious intent poses a special threat to any facility. The subject of “insider threat” has garnered significant attention and mitigation efforts in the past fifteen years (Bunn and Sagan, n.d.). There have been substantial efforts to develop general insider threat detection and mitigation programs (FEMA, n.d.), particularly within government agencies and for defense contractors (DHRA, n.d.). Yet, in certain sectors – often related to the materials consumed or produced therein – the threat lies not only in the theft of information and the disruption of an organization’s functions, but also in the possibility that sabotage by insiders could have extremely detrimental consequences for broader public health and safety. The release of over 40 tons of highly toxic methyl isocyanate from the Union Carbide insecticide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984 and the thousands of resulting deaths , provide an indication of the scale of harm that could result from a major accident at a chemical facility, whatever the cause (Broughton, 2005). Therefore, sabotage of facilities and transportation vehicles containing highly toxic chemicals 16 At the time of writing this report, the statutory authority for the CFATS program (6 CFR Part 27) expired and has yet to be reauthorized. Prepublication Copy 90 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism poses a serious threat, particularly as it eliminates the need for a terrorist to procure the chemical of concern in quantities sufficient to create massive death and destruction by a deliberate release, as was suspected in the Bhopal disaster (Broughton, 2005). “The worst incident of accidental chemical release to date was the 1984 Bhopal disaster. On the night of December 3, 1984, 40 tons of methyl-isocyanate (MIC) gas were accidentally released from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. Environmental conditions were particularly favorable for dispersion, and a plume of gas dispersed over the city of approximately one million inhabitants. Although there remain many uncertainties regarding the consequences of the release, it is likely that as many as 500,000 people were exposed to the gas. At least 3,800 people died immediately, most from an impoverished neighborhood in immediate proximity to the plant, with several thousand more dying over the next few days. An unknown, but almost certainly very large, number of people suffered minor to severe injuries, including permanent blindness, some portion of which resulted in premature deaths. Although there have been allegations that the release was the result of a deliberate act by a disgruntled employee, these claims have lacked credence and ultimately the disaster appears to have resulted from mismanagement combined with inadequate training and mechanical failure” (Broughton, 2005). Yet, despite the sizable number of facilities housing dangerous chemicals, there is no explicit reference in any of the strategy documents surveyed to addressing the insider threat in the chemical terrorism context. This is in contrast to the direct mention of the challenge posed by insiders in the context of nuclear and biological weapons within United States strategy documents.17 It is also worth noting that in the case of Bhopal and at least one other case, company representatives and others attempted to place blame on saboteurs or terrorists when courts concluded that willful negligence was the cause of an explosion.18 Although safety and security are the same word in many languages, safety is not synonymous with security. OPCW defines safety as” measures to prevent non-deliberate releases of toxic chemicals into the environment and to mitigate the impact if such events occur” and security as “measures to prevent deliberate releases of toxic chemicals and to mitigate the impact if such events occur” (OPCW, 2016). Insider threats therefore focus on concerted efforts of someone with access and knowledge to circumvent safety systems and deliberately release hazardous chemicals with the intent of creating harm. It should be noted that neither the Responsible Care Security Code of the American Chemistry Council nor the OPCW convention single out insider threats. The committee did learn that the CFATS program included some practical efforts to counter insider threats within the chemical industry (Gotten, 2020). For example, CFATS required criminal background checks of personnel working at high-threat facilities, Their staff could facilitate the vetting of personnel in regulated facilities against Terrorist Screening Databases, and CFATS provided some training materials that touch on insider threats. However, mitigating insider threat goes far beyond such basic checks and the assistance program appeared to be quite limited and 17 See p. 9 of the National CWMDT Strategy. 18 Union Carbide claimed that the Bhopal disaster resulted from sabotage by an employee, but the courts concluded that the disaster was caused by negligence. (Eckerman, 2005; Indian Express, 2017). Seventeen years later, an explosion in Toulouse was blamed on terrorists (France 24, 2017). Prepublication Copy 91 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies nascent. The National Insider Threat Task Force under the ODNI does not have any programs that specifically apply to the chemical sector, nor was the committee able to find evidence of similar efforts to the former CFATS activities directed towards government facilities or within academic research institutions. The complexity of the chemical industry and chemical facilities in other sectors is likely to increase as the industry grows and the integration of cyber-physical systems in chemical manufacturing and transportation introduce additional vulnerabilities. The unique character of this industry requires dedicated research to understand the insider threat in this context and then a focused program to develop tools and procedures to mitigate the threat. This distinct effort, which would need to be resourced, would not be starting from scratch, but can fruitfully build on existing insider threat expertise, and potentially draw on best practices from both the nuclear and biological security domains. Such a program would be most useful if it were a collaborative private-public effort, most likely between CISA, the National Insider Threat Task Force and the chemical industry. One potentially fruitful approach for implementation would be for CISA to expand the assistance it can provide industry both through former CFATS channels (see Box 5-3 for description of CFATs previous activities) and to other facilities through the emerging ChemLock program. At the same time, there are considerable ongoing government and non-government efforts in the nuclear, radiological, and biological domains particularly designed to mitigate the insider threat in these specific contexts. FINDING 5-4a: The strategic documents surveyed do not explicitly mention insider threat in the chemical terrorism context. FINDING 5-4b: While CFATS included some practical efforts to counter insider threats within the chemical industry, the scope of these efforts appears to be limited and has been discontinued, and the committee did not find evidence of a similar systematic program either directed towards government facilities or within academic research institutions. CONCLUSION 5-4: The significant potential consequences of an insider at a chemical facility conducting or assisting an attack warrants explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies to counter insider threats at any facility containing significant quantities of toxic chemicals. RECOMMENDATION 5-4: Counter-insider threat activities should be incorporated explicitly into broader counter-WMD strategy. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence with other public and private partners should develop a strategy to ameliorate insider threats explicitly for the chemical domain. Prepublication Copy 92 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism BOX 5-3 Congressional Actions to Address Chemical Threat through Sabotage of Facilities Mindful of the threat posed by chemical facilities, Congress included in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295 a section (§550), which directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to promulgate “interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for security of chemical facilities” within six months of the enactment of the Act. This Act also mandated the development of vulnerability assessments, as well as the development and implementation of site security plans for high-risk chemical facilities. “Facilities” include critical infrastructures that use, manufacture, store, or handle specific quantities of chemicals that DHS has identified as being extremely dangerous. The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulatory program was developed to fulfill the requirements of the 2007 Act, but authorization for the program was not renewed in 2023. Previously managed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), this program identified and regulated high-risk chemical facilities to ensure security measures were in place to reduce the risk of certain hazardous chemicals being weaponized. In 2014, Congress enacted the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-254, to reauthorize and codify the CFATS Regulatory Program (6 U.S.C. §§ 621-29). This legislation laid the foundation for the continued maturation of the CFATS program, adding new provisions as needed while preserving most of the existing regulations. Subsequent legislation in 2019 and 2020 extended the program until July 2023. The overall regulatory program for chemical facility and transportation defense, as administered through CFATS and other policies involved: Identifying high-risk facilities in key infrastructure sectors. CFATS used a dynamic multi-tiered risk assessment process to identify facilities that were high risk. Security Plans. Required the facilities judged to be at -high-risk tiers to develop and implement appropriate Security Plans that met applicable risk-based performance standards (RBPS) for securing chemicals of interest. These standards included ensuring that they had effective security measures in place, so the risks associated with these chemicals could be mitigated. Security plans included items such as employee screening and background checks, area perimeter fencing, intruder detection systems, restricted access, video-verified monitoring, rigid maintenance systems, and employee training. Verification. Inspections of facilities to validate the implementation of approved Security Plans were carried out by CISA, which was authorized to conduct inspections and enforce the provisions. CISA inspectors had the authority to enter, inspect, and audit the property, equipment, operations, and records of CFATS-covered facilities. 5.1.5 Examples of Current Program Activities Not Mentioned in Strategies The committee found some cases in which important activities that the USG is appropriately undertaking are surprisingly absent from the strategy documents reviewed. Here are four significant examples: Prepublication Copy 93 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies A. On the interdiction side, the strategy documents do not explicitly mention developing military capabilities to recognize early warning signs of chemical terrorism plots, despite the committee being aware that such activity occurs in practice. B. In contrast with the military, there is no explicit mention in the strategies of domestic law enforcement possessing the ability to counter chemical threats at the tactical level, including containment, disablement, and neutralization. While HAZMAT first responders and some specialized divisions of the FBI possess some of these capabilities, they are not referenced in the strategies. This observation is in contrast with such references with regard to nuclear/radiation, for example. C. The committee found only a few and indirect references to integrating combating WMD terrorism, and specifically chemical terrorism, within broader counterterrorism efforts. Combating WMD, including chemical terrorism, requires some specialized activities and capabilities. At the same time, chemical terrorism is a subset of the broader terrorist threat, and preventing and countering chemical terrorism must therefore integrate closely with other, non-WMD, aspects of the chemical terrorism threat. Beyond a general reference to incorporating WMD-specific considerations into intelligence activities (which amounts in the current instance to technical chemical capabilities and knowledge) and collaboration between chemists / chemical weapons experts and the intelligence community (IC), there appears to be insufficient mention in the strategies of employing or integrating with broader chemical terrorism prevention and countering approaches. The committee is aware of some integration in practice, and the particulars are difficult to assess in the unclassified setting. The same can be made for integrating efforts to prevent / counter chemical terrorism into broader efforts to counter smuggling (which involves different sets of government actors). D. When the strategies refer to multilateral activities, they solely reference the CWC and its associated implementing agency, the OPCW. These are the highest-level focal points for international efforts to address chemical weapons threats, but they are primarily focused on state-level threats as opposed to terrorist ones and they are far from the sole contexts in which these threats are addressed. For example, other multilateral (involving most states) or plurilateral (involving many states) efforts include UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group, and others (NTI, 2013; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d.; United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, n.d.). FINDING 5-5: The committee found that certain key activities that the U.S. government is appropriately undertaking were surprisingly absent from the strategy documents reviewed, including military capabilities to provide early warning of chemical terrorism plots; law enforcement capabilities to counter chemical threats tactically; integration with broader counter-terrorism and counter- smuggling efforts; and involvement with other multilateral activities beyond the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Prepublication Copy 94 

Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism CONCLUSION 5-5: The committee concludes certain key activities that are undertaken in practice to prevent and counter chemical terrorism are sufficiently important to merit inclusion in strategy documents. The absence of such activities from the strategies could impact policy implementation, including budgeting, program prioritization, and other consequences. Including these activities in existing strategies would bolster the comprehensiveness, and therefore effectiveness, of existing strategies. RECOMMENDATION 5-5: Agencies should work to reconcile operational practice with policy by supplementing extant strategies to include current omitted effective activities and programs for countering chemical terrorism. This would ensure that effective practices are maintained, properly resourced, and reflected in comprehensive strategies. 5.2 IMPLICATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGIC SHIFT FROM VEOS TO GPC FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF “PREVENT/COUNTER” The shift in emphasis from threats posed by VEOs to state-sponsored threats arising from great power competition (Caves and Carus, 2021)19 further complicates the prevent and counter task. Notably, it is likely that resources for identifying VEO terrorism threats will be redirected toward GPC threats. Yet, if great power conflict intensifies, that has many potential implications for chemical terrorist threats, beyond the possible reduction of resources available to address them. First, even if states simply maintain defensive programs against state-based chemical threats, as many do today, those programs have dual-use implications for (non-state) offensive threats. That means that expertise, technology, and materials, including chemical agents, might illicitly migrate from defensive programs to non-state actors, as apparently occurred in the biological weapons domain with the so-called Amerithrax case (DOJ, 2010). Second, states might also choose to engage in offensive chemical weapons activities—as some states, notably Russia, appear to be doing today—and technology, materials, expertise, and/or chemical agents might be illicitly transferred from those programs to non-state actors either intentionally or otherwise. Third, states, including great powers, even if there is no leakage from their own programs, might use or support non-state actors in acquiring or deploying chemical weapons. Witting or unwitting involvement of states in non-state chemical terrorism could dramatically increase the sophistication of such attacks, including the agent employed and/or the means by which it is delivered. Finally, states, including great powers, might engage in the use of chemical agents in ways that might be categorized as “state terrorism”—as some have alleged both Russia and North Korea to have done with targeted attacks in recent years—though the committee recognizes that this concept is controversial and difficult to clearly define. 5.3 SUMMARY The committee’s assessment of unclassified strategies reveals opportunities to enhance direct deterrence of chemical terrorism by incorporating it into existing CWMDT terrorism 19 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, December, 2017. Prepublication Copy 95 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies strategies. A strategic communications effort that leverages preventive and mitigating measures against chemical terrorism as part of a policy of deterrence by denial was lacking in the evaluated documents. Chemical substitution, also, was not included in the overall chemical security strategy; despite ongoing industry practices and some initiatives under DHS’s CFATS. Insider threats stemming from chemical facilities are a major prevent/counter concern; however, it was not explicitly addressed in the surveyed reports. This absence necessitates explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies. Finally, key activities, such as military capabilities for early warning, law enforcement to counter chemical threats, and involvement in multilateral activities, were minimally discussed in the reviewed documents; even though they do occur in the USG based on briefings presented to the committee. The discrepancy between de jure vs de facto strategies could affect chemical terrorism policy comprehensiveness. Including these activities would further ensure that effective practices are properly maintained and resourced. The next chapter examines strategies related to responding to chemical incidents whether 1) from an attack that was not prevented/countered or 2) from an accident. REFERENCES Becker, P. and Nalabandian, M. 2022. DTRA Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, briefing to the Chem Threats Committee, August 8, 2022. ISN briefing. Broughton, E. 2005. The Bhopal Disaster and its Aftermath: A Review. Environmental Health 4:6. Bunn and Sagan (eds). n.d. National Insider Threat Policy. https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/ documents/nittf/EO_13587.pdf; https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/nittf/ National_Insider_Threat_Policy.pdf; Bunn and Sagan (eds). Croddy, E. 2002. Dealing with Al Shifa: Intelligence and Counterproliferation. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 15(1):52–60. DHRA (Defense Human Resources Activity). n.d. Insider Threat Program for Industry. https://www.cdse.edu/Training/Insider-Threat/; https://www.dhra.mil/perserec/ ; https://www.cdse.edu/Portals/124/Documents/jobaids/insider/insider-threat-job-aid-for- industry.pdf. DOS (U.S. Department of State). 2003. Proliferation Security Initiative. https://www.state.gov/ proliferation-security-initiative. Eckerman, I. 2005. The Bhopal Saga—Causes and Consequences of the World’s Largest Industrial Disaster. India: Universities Press. Executive Office of the President. 2002. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Exec (Executive) Order No. 13650, Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. 2013. Exec. Order No. 13650, Final Amendments to the Risk Management Program (RMP) Rule. 2018. FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). n.d. Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Insider Threats. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we-work/ncsc-nittf/ncsc-nittf- resource-library; FEMA - Emergency Management Institute (EMI) Course | IS-915. Prepublication Copy 96 

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Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. (n.d.). Ensuring Effective Interagency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in Case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks. 2017. https://www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/uncct_ctitf_wmd_ wg_project_publication_final.pdf. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2004. Security Council resolution 1540. Concerning Weapons of Massive Destruction. S/RES/1540. https://www.refworld.org/docid/41136 6744.html. Prepublication Copy 98