Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)
742
90 S.Ct. 1463
25 L.Ed.2d 747
In 1967, petitioner sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his plea
of guilty was not voluntarily given because 1201(a) operated to coerce his
plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and
because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of
sentence and clemency. It was also alleged that the trial judge had not fully
complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3
After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief.
According to the District Court's findings, petitioner's counsel did not put
impermissible pressure on petitioner to plead guilty and no representations were
made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency. The court held that
1201(a) was constitutional and found that petitioner decided to plead guilty
when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty: petitioner
pleaded guilty 'by reason of other matters and not by reason of the statute' or
because of any acts of the trial judge. The court concluded that 'the plea was
voluntarily and knowingly made.'
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the
District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and
specifically approving the finding that petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntary.
404 F.2d 601 (1968). We granted certiorari, 395 U.S. 976, 89 S.Ct. 2146, 23
L.Ed.2d 764 (1969), to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in
error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of this Court's decision in
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968).
We affirm.
Since the 'inevitable effect' of the death penalty provision of 1201(a) was said
by the Court to be the needless encouragement of pleas of guilty and waivers of
jury trial, Brady contends that Jackson requires the invalidation of every plea of
guilty entered under that section, at least when the fear of death is shown to
have been a factor in the plea. Petitioner, however, has read far too much into
the Jackson opinion.
7
The Court made it clear in Jackson that it was not holding 1201(a) inherently
coercive of guilty pleas: 'the fact that the Federal Kidnaping Act tends to
discourage defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial
by jury hardly implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge
under the Act does so involuntarily.' 390 U.S., at 583, 88 S.Ct., at 1217. Cited
in support of this statement, 390 U.S., at 583 n. 25, 88 S.Ct., at 1217, was
Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F.Supp. 581 (D.C.N.J.1967), where a plea of guilty
(non vult) under a similar statute was sustained as voluntary in spite of the fact,
as found by the District Court, that the defendant was greatly upset by the
possibility of receiving the death penalty.
Moreover, the Court in Jackson rejected a suggestion that the death penalty
provision of 1201(a) be saved by prohibiting in capital kidnaping cases all
guilty pleas and jury waivers, 'however clear (the defendants') guilt and
however strong their desire to acknowledge it in order to spare themselves and
their families the spectacle and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings.'
'(T)hat jury waivers and guilty pleas may occasionally be rejected' was no
ground for automatically rejecting all guilty pleas under the statute, for such a
rule 'would rob the criminal process of much of its flexibility.' 390 U.S., at 584,
88 S.Ct., at 1218.
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged
by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such
encouraged pleas are invalid wheth-involuntary or not. Jackson prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty under 1201(a), but that decision neither
fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a
new application of the test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated
that guilty pleas are valid if both 'voluntary' and 'intelligent.' See Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 17111712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969).4
10
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment has long been recognized. Central to the plea and the foundation
for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in
open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. He thus stands
as a witness against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth Amendment from
being compelled to do sohence the minimum requirement that his plea be the
voluntary expression of his own choice.5 But the plea is more than an
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judgment of
conviction may be entered without a triala waiver of his right to trial before a
jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.6 On neither score was Brady's plea of
guilty invalid.
II
11
The trial judge in 1959 found the plea voluntary before accepting it; the District
Court in 1968, after an evidentiary hearing, found that the plea was voluntarily
made; the Court of Appeals specifically approved the finding of voluntariness.
We see no reason on this record to disturb the judgment of those courts.
Petitioner, advised by competent counsel, tendered his plea after his
codefendant, who had already given a confession, determined to plead guilty
and became available to testify against petitioner. It was this development that
the District Court found to have triggered Brady's guilty plea.
12
13
The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in
the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State's law is alone
sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For
others, apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar
them into admitting their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment
accumulation of evidence may convince the defendant and his counsel that a
trial is not worth the agony and expense to the defendant and his family. All
these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State's responsibility for some of
the factors motivating the pleas; the pleas are no more improperly compelled
than is the decision by a defendant at the close of the State's evidence at trial
that he must take the stand or face certain conviction.
14
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the
defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is there evidence
that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope of leniency that
he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty. Brady's
claim is of a different sort: that it violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or
encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise of leniency and that a guilty
plea is coerced and invalid if influenced by the fear of a possibly higher penalty
for the crime charged if a conviction is obtained after the State is put to its
proof.
15
16
The issue we deal with is inherent in the criminal law and its administration
because guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden, because the criminal
law characteristically extends to judge or jury a range of choice in setting the
sentence in individual cases, and because both the State and the defendant often
find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of the maximum penalty
authorized by law. For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the
practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also
advantagesthe more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of
guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for
those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in
which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.9 It
is this mutuality of advantage that perhaps explains the fact that at present well
over three-fourths of the criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of
guilty,10 a great many of them no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or
assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty
verdict after a trial to judge or jury.
17
Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does not necessarily
validate those pleas or the system which produces them. But we cannot hold
that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in
turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional
system in a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.
18
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Government to forbid
guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single invariable penalty for each crime
defined by the statutes, or to place the sentencing function in a separate
authority having no knowledge of the manner in which the conviction in each
case was obtained. In any event, it would be necessary to forbid prosecutors
and judges to accept guilty pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses,
or to reduced charges. The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far.
19
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), held
that the admissibility of a confession depended upon whether it was compelled
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. To be admissible, a confession
must be "free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats
or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor
by the exertion of any improper influence." 168 U.S., at 542543, 18 S.Ct., at
187. More recently, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d
653 (1964), carried forward the Bram definition of compulsion in the course of
holding applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.11
20
Bram is not inconsistent with our holding that Brady's plea was not compelled
even though the law promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did not go to
trial. Bram dealt with a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and
22
23
"(A) plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e.g. bribes).' 242 F.2d at page 115.'13
24
Under this standard, a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to
avoid the possibility of a death penalty.14
III
25
The record before us also supports the conclusion that Brady's plea was
intelligently made. He was advised by competent counsel, he was made aware
of the nature of the charge against him, and there was nothing to indicate that
he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties; once his
It is true that Brady's counsel advised him that 1201(a) empowered the jury to
impose the death penalty and that nine years later in United States v. Jackson,
supra, the Court held that the jury had no such power as long as the judge could
impose only a lesser penalty if trial was to the court or there was a plea of
guilty. But these facts do not require us to set aside Brady's conviction.
27
28
The fact that Brady did not anticipate United States v. Jackson, supra, does not
impugn the truth or reliability of his plea. We find no requirement in the
Constitution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn
admissions in open court that he committed the act with which he is charged
simply because it later develops that the State would have had a weaker case
than the defendant had thought or that the maximum penalty then assumed
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the innocent
or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in this country are
necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction is no more foolproof
than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly, we take great
precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether
conviction is by plea or by trial. We would have serious doubts about this case
if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially
increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would
falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our
expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are
voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate
advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and
reliability of the defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes with
which they are charged. In the case before us, nothing in the record impeaches
Brady's plea or suggests that his admissions in open court were anything but the
truth.
30
Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by a
desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was
voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt that his
solemn admission of guilt was truthful.
31
Affirmed.
32
Mr. Justice BLACK, while adhering to his belief that United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, was wrongly decided, concurs in
the judgment and in substantially all of the opinion in this case.
Eight days after petitioner pleaded guilty, he was brought before the court for
sentencing. At that time, the court questioned petitioner for a second time about
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d
473 (1962); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104, 62 S.Ct. 964, 965966, 86
L.Ed. 1302 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286, 61 S.Ct. 574, 579,
85 L.Ed. 830 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84
L.Ed. 716 (1940); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582,
583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927).
See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966);
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 240,
87 L.Ed. 268 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019,
1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50
S.Ct. 253, 263, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930).
Since an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is
frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney, this Court has
scrutinized with special care pleas of guilty entered by defendants without the
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of the right to counsel. See
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 76 S.Ct. 223, 100 L.Ed.
126 (1956); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 and 727, 68 S.Ct. 316 and
325, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (opinions of Black and Frankfurter, JJ.); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945). Since Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), it has been
clear that a guilty plea to a felony charge entered without counsel and without a
waiver of counsel is invalid. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct.
1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S.Ct.
35, 21 L.Ed.2d 5 (1968).
The importance of assuring that a defendant does not plead guilty except with a
full understanding of the charges against him and the possible consequences of
his plea was at the heart of our recent decisions in McCarthy v. United States,
supra, and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969). See nn. 3 and 4, supra.
7
Such a possibility seems to have been rejected by the District Court in the
2255 proceedings. That court found that 'the plea of guilty was made by the
petitioner by reason of other matters and not by reason of the statute * * *.'
For a more elaborate discussion of the factors that may justify a reduction in
penalty upon a plea of guilty, see American Bar Association Project on
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 1.8 and commentary, pp. 37
52 (Approved Draft 1968).
10
It has been estimated that about 90%, and perhaps 95%, of all criminal
convictions are by pleas of guilty; between 70% and 85% of all felony
convictions are estimated to be by guilty plea. D. Newman, Conviction, The
Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial 3 and n. 1 (1966).
11
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10
L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 622623, 16 S.Ct. 895, 899900, 40 L.Ed. 1090
(1896).
12
'The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the
adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege (against compelled selfincrimination). His presence would insure that statements made in the
government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.'
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1623 (1966).
13
Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n. 2 (C.A.5th Cir. 1957) (en banc),
rev'd on confession of error on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2
L.Ed.2d 579 (1958).
14
Our conclusion in this regard seems to coincide with the conclusions of most of
the lower federal courts that have considered whether a guilty plea to avoid a
possible death penalty is involuntary. See United States ex rel. Brown v.
LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (C.A.2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d
1216 (C.A.9th Cir. 1969); Pindell v. United States, 296 F.Supp. 751
(D.C.Conn.1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F.Supp. 969
(D.C.Md.1968), aff'd, No. 13,146 (C.A.4th Cir., May 1, 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1077, 90 S.Ct. 1525, 25 L.Ed.2d 811; Laboy v. New Jersey, 266
F.Supp. 581 (D.C.N.J.1967); Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (C.A.9th Cir.
1966); Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (C.A.5th Cir. 1966); Cooper v. Holman,
356 F.2d 82 (C.A.5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855, 87 S.Ct. 103, 17
L.Ed.2d 83 (1966); Godlock v. Ross, 259 F.Supp. 659 (D.C.E.D.N.C.1966);
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Fay, 348 F.2d 705 (C.A.2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 997, 86 S.Ct. 583, 15 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966); Overman v. United
States, 281 F.2d 497 (C.A.6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82 S.Ct.
612, 7 L.Ed.2d 530 (1962); Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (C.A.5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 921, 79 S.Ct. 294, 3 L.Ed.2d 240 (1958). But see
Shaw v. United States, 299 F.Supp. 824 (D.C.S.D.Ga.1969); Alford v. North
Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (C.A.4th Cir. 1968), prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 956, 89
S.Ct. 1306, 22 L.Ed.2d 558 (1969), restored to calendar for reargument, 397
U.S. 1060, 90 S.Ct. 1494, 25 L.Ed.2d 682.