Marshall V Marshall Ninth Circuit
Marshall V Marshall Ninth Circuit
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
4483
IN RE MARSHALL 4487
COUNSEL
OPINION
We further note that, when it took additional evidence on the case, the
district court likewise limited to some extent the testimony and evidence
Pierce Marshall was able to introduce. Pierce Marshall claims that the dis-
trict court violated his due process rights with this ruling and other eviden-
tiary decisions. Because we conclude that Pierce Marshall is entitled to
judgment in his favor for other reasons, we need not address his due pro-
cess claim.
4502 IN RE MARSHALL
on her belief that the bankruptcy court had the authority to
enter a final judgment on the counterclaim against Pierce
Marshall, Vickie Lynn Marshall elected to dismiss her claims
against J. Howard Marshall II’s estate and against Pierce Mar-
shall both individually and in his representative capacities.18
that any and all claims that have been or should have
been asserted by Vickie Lynn Marshall . . . based
upon alleged representations, promises, or agree-
ments made by J. Howard Marshall II to or with
Vickie Lynn Marshall . . . have been disposed of in
this proceeding; . . .
III
Congress did not act in time, and the Court’s mandate took
effect. Faced with the potential collapse of the bankruptcy
system, the Judicial Conference “adopt[ed] a resolution
requiring the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to ‘provide each circuit with a proposed
rule’ which was to take effect [as a local rule] in the absence
of congressional action.” Countryman, supra, at 19; see Col-
lier ¶ 3.01[2][b][ii] & n.16 (discussing the emergency rule and
reproducing its text). The purpose of this resolution was “to
permit the bankruptcy system to continue without disruption
in reliance on jurisdictional grants remaining in the law as
limited by” Marathon. Countryman, supra, at 19.
[1] Under the 1984 Act the district court continues to have
original jurisdiction over all cases under title 11 and “all civil
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b). The district
court, in turn, may refer “any or all cases under title 11 and
any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11” to the bankruptcy court. Id.
§ 157(a). Thus, as under the 1978 Act, the bankruptcy court’s
subject matter jurisdiction under the 1984 Act is coterminous
with that of the district court. See id. §§ 157(a), 1334; Fietz
v. Great W. Sav. (In re Fietz), 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir.
1988).
[4] The 1984 Act does not specifically detail what it means
for a civil proceeding to “arise under title 11,” “arise in a case
under title 11,” “or relate[ ] to a case under title 11.” Our case
law, however, holds that proceedings “arise under title 11” if
they “involve a cause of action created or determined by a
In re Feitz, 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Pacor,
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Under Texas law, an issue has been “fully and fairly litigat-
ed” if the particular fact or issue was the same in the two pro-
ceedings and was “actually litigated” in the prior proceeding.
See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d 66,
71 (Tex. App. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 873 S.W.2d
633, 637 (Tex. 1994). To determine if a matter was “actually
litigated,” Texas courts consider the following factors:
“whether the parties were fully heard; whether the court sup-
ported its decision with reasoned opinion; and whether the
decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on
appeal.” Cole v. G.O. Assocs., Ltd., 847 S.W.2d 429, 431
(Tex. App. 1993).
4530 IN RE MARSHALL
2
IV