First Division: Rosal Hubilla Y Carillo, Petitioner, vs. People of The PHILIPPINES, Respondent
First Division: Rosal Hubilla Y Carillo, Petitioner, vs. People of The PHILIPPINES, Respondent
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 ( Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the
law through measures that will ensure the observance of international standards
of child protection, 1 and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws,
policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law. 2 The
mandate notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the
penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner
with homicide under the following information docketed as Criminal Case No.
2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in
Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill,
and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA
with a knife, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus,
directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as
annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice
of the deceased's heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as
follows:
Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of
March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate
of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony if the
high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein
victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and
stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the
appellant stabbed the victim, this witness demonstrated that with the
appellant's left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the
victim using a bladed weapon.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was
stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol
Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in
the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later, however, when
her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that
her son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was subjected to
another operation, but died the day after. prcd
She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police
authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake
and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of
the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ
failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined
cause of death was a stab wound.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy
and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who
attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus,
however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of the four men
who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was,
then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a knife, he
stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria,
who was graduating that day. He went home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought
him to the barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the
town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason
Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it. 4
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual
damages in the amount of Php81,890.04, representing expenses for
medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php16,300.00. A civil
indemnity, in the amount of Php50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs
of the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not
correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile
in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In
fine, he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his
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conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or
not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised
Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not
he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under
Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of
imprisonment contravened the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other
international agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the
time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days
old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, 8 such minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor. 9
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty,
which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six
years). For the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its
medium period — eight years and one day to 10 years — was proper because
there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate
sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only
six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal
Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or
justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To
yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the
Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC 10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides
certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases involving a child in
conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction
with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child
shall be limited to the minimum. 11 Consistent with this principle, the amended
decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty
for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No.
9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or
lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with
the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9 (a) of Presidential Decree 968, 12 which disqualifies
from probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to
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the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the
sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the
suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age,
pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of
his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his
conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his
sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation
of his rights as a child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No.
9344 and international agreements. CTSAaH
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with
the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to
certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention
or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or
imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No.
9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because
the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified
from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements 13 supports the course of action
taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), 14 the United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty 15 are
consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition,
provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he
has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training
facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau
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of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, in a manner consistent with the offender child's best interest.
Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS
the amended decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court for
implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the
petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training
facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. * and Perez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* Vice Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe per Special Order No. 1885 dated
November 24, 2014.
1. Republic Act No. 9344, Section 2 (b).
2. Republic Act No. 9344, Section 2 (f).
3. Rollo, p. 21.
4. Id. at 31-33.
5. Id. at 22-27.
6. Id. at 29-44; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (deceased), concurred in
by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente (retired) and Associate Justice
Sesinando E. Villon.
7. Id. at 58-62.
8. Per his birth certificate, Rosal's date of birth was November 2, 1982.
9. Article 68, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the
minimum, and where discretion is given by law to the judge to determine
whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the imposition of fine being preferred
as the more appropriate penalty; (Emphasis Supplied)
12. Establishing a Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes (July 24, 1976).