Daybell Motion To Strike Death Penalty As Arbitrary Capricious Disproportionate
Daybell Motion To Strike Death Penalty As Arbitrary Capricious Disproportionate
11/9/2023 11:37 AM
Seventh Judicial District, Fremont County
Abbie Mace, Clerk of the Court
By: Becky Harrigfeld, Deputy Clerk
JOHN PRIOR
LAW OFFICES OF JOHN PRIOR
ISB#5344
429 SW 5‘“ Avenue #110
Meridian, Idaho 83642
(208) 465-9839 Telephone
Email [email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
COMES NOW the Defendant, Chad Daybell, and through undersigned counsel, submits
this Motion to Strike the Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Capricious, and DisprOportionate in light of
Striking Death in Co—Defendant’s Case. Pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, Idaho Const. Article I, Sections 6, 7, 8 and 13, as well as the
legal authorities cited below, Mr. Daybell respectfully requests that the Court strike the death
penalty as a sentencing option to avoid a situation where the severity of punishment turns on a co-
defendant’s decision whether or not to waive speedy trial rights, as opposed to their relative levels
connection with the deaths of Tylee Ryan, J .J . Vallow, and Tamara Douglas Daybell. On
August
l
5, 2021, and May 2, 2022, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty against Mr.
Daybell and Ms. Vallow, respectively. On August l9, 2021, Mr. Daybell waived his right to a
speedy trial. On March 3, 2023, the Court severed Mr. Daybell’s and Ms. Vallow’s trials.
On March 21, 2023, the Court struck the State’s May 2, 2022, Notice of Intent to Seek the
Death Penalty against Ms. Vallow. From the bench, the Court stated that striking death was “an
appropriate discovery sanction” and was necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of Ms.
Vallow were protected. The Court did not extend the decision to Mr. Daybell, even though the
State had committed the same discovery violations against Mr. Daybell, since he had waived his
speedy trial rights. As such, the Court has permitted the continued pursuit of only one co-
defendant’s death due solely to that defendant’s waiver of speedy trial rights.1
ARGUMENT
“The fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special ‘need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment" in any capital case.” Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (citations omitted). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the Eighth Amendment demands that the death
penalty, as the most severe
punishment, “must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious
crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.”
Simmons,
l
When the Court struck the death penalty in Ms. Vallow’s case, the State made clear that
it still desired to seek her death and that its position as to her
meriting the death penalty had not
changed. The State requested alternative remedies, including a continuance, that would have
permitted the State to continue seeking her death. The Court denied this request because she had
asserted her Speedy trial rights. As such, the decision to strike death in Ms. Vallow’s case—~and
the decision to continue pursuing it in Mr.
Daybell’s case—did not tum on an assertion that Ms.
Vallow is less culpable than Mr. Daybell.
There must be a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 188
(1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring». Amongst
the entire class of murderers, the death penalty must be reserved for “the worst of the worst.”
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). While every murder is
appalling, “the average murderer” is insufficiently culpable to “justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). Though the State has wide
latitude under the Eighth Amendment to seek severe non-death sentences in all other criminal
cases, the Eighth Amendment’s special constraints on the death penalty must be enforced by this
Court.
In this case, there is a single distinguishing feature that explains why the State continues to
seek the death penalty against Mr. Daybell even after it was struck against Ms. Vallow—Mr.
Daybell waived his right to speedy trial. Willingness to waive speedy trial rights cannot
constitutionally be the deciding factor in who lives and who dies. See, e. g., People v. Kliner.
705 N.E.2d 850, 897 (Ill. 1998) (holding that, in capital cases, “similarly situated codefendants
should not be given arbitrarily or unreasonably disparate Sentences”); Larzelere v. Stale, 676 So.2d
394, 406 (Fla. 1996) (“When a codefendant (or coconspirator) is equally as culpable or more
culpable than the defendant, disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant‘s
punishment disproportionate”). The willingness to waive speedy trial rights does not correSpond
to the defendants most culpable and deserving of death, and therefore it is unconstitutionally
arbitrary under Furman and Gregg for this willingness to waive to determine which co—defendant
remains eligible for the death penalty. The prosecution cannot continue to seek Mr. Daybell’s
execution solely because he waived his speedy trial rights, while his co-defendant did not. 1t would
be at odds with the reality of the criminaljustice system—and would establish dangerous precedent
regarding how to advise clients in co—defendant cases—to suggest that Mr. Daybell should face a
far more severe punishment than his co-defendant, simply because he waived constitutional right.
Given that the death penalty must be reserved only for the “worst of the worst,” the pursuit
of a death sentence must be based on the relative culpability of a person accused of murder, and
cannot be based on arbitrary or capricious factors outside of a defendant’s own alleged offenses
and characteristics. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991)
(holding that due
Government violates a defendant’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when its decision to seek the death penalty is arbitrary and
capricious.” United
States v. Littrell, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (striking death as a potential
sentencing option after finding that the govemment’s decision to seek the penalty was arbitrary
rights, and to avoid violating the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, the death
penalty may only be sought “in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals
for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not.”2 Spazicmo v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016)
(emphasis added).
2
As the Supreme Court has made clear, when decisions to seek or impose a death sentence
rest on arbitrary and capricious factors—wie, those that do not relate to the offender’s
alleged
crimes or relative culpability—it does not matter whether the factors intentionally
impacted the
deecisions; impermissible considerations violate a defendant‘s rights regardless of intention. See,
e.g._, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980).
4
The legitimacy of our entire system of capital punishment is premised on the notion that
the death penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. Gregg,
428 U.S. at 188-89 (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
Just as the decision of who lives and dies cannot rest on chance, it also cannot tum on the
rights asserted (or waived) by a criminal defendant during prosecution. In United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Supreme Court examined and struck down the Federal
Kidnaping Act,
which prohibited the death penalty for defendants who acceded to a bench trial and abandoned
their right to contest their guilt before a jury but authorized death where defendant
proceeded to
jury trial. The Court reasoned that “[t]he goal of limiting the death penalty to cases is [sic] which
ajury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved without penalizing
those defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury trial.” Id. at 582. In a similar
way, it was
a “legitimate” aim of this Court to ensure that Ms. Vallow did not face the death penalty based on
incomplete or late discovery, but that goal does not permit authorizing differential punishments
between her and her co-defendant~—against the stated desires of the
prosecution—solely because
she asserted her speedy trial right while her co-defendant waived it.
The sole distinguishing feature between the penalty being sought in this case and Mr.
Daybell’s co-defendant’s case is that Mr. Daybell waived his speedy trial rights—not because Mr.
Daybell is more culpable or somehow deemed more deserving of the death penalty. Only because
Mr. Daybell waived his speedy trial rights and thus permitted the State
greater time to comply with
Thus, the difference in sentence being sought between these co—defendants is not due to the
perceived or argued-for culpability in relation to the alleged offenses, but rather due to the State’s
II. Permitting More Severe Punishment because a Defendant Waived His Speedy Trial
Rights Raises Additional Constitutional Concerns.
If Mr. Daybell had not waived his speedy trial rights, he would not be facing the death
penalty. He was not advised of this potential outcome at the time of his waiver and this raises many
issues. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
l, § 13, of the
Idaho 33 7, 340 (Ct. App. 2021). “The speedy trial guarantees are
designed to minimize the
possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial; to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial,
impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail; and to shorten the disruption
oflife caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” Stare v.
Lopez, 144 Idaho
349, 352 (Ct. App. 2007); see also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986); United
waiver.” 1d. (emphasis added). When Mr. Daybell waived his right to speedy trial on August 19,
2021, he did not know that it may lead to a situation where he would—solely on the basis of this
asserted right—face far more severe punishment than his co-defendant. As such, if this Court does
not strike death in this case to ensure reasonably equal treatment of the co-defendants under the
law, then Mr. Daybell’s initial waiver will be called into question, since he was not advised of this
potential and significant consequence. Even if an appellate court determined that his initial waiver
was made knowingly, he would have a strong argument that he was provided ineffective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, since
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Daybell respectfully requests that this Court strike the
State’s August 5, 2021, Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty pursuant to the
Sixth. Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Idaho Const. Article Sections
I, 6.
7, 8 and 13. In doing so, the Court will ensure that decisions of whether defendants should live or
die do not turn on whether they have waived or asserted speedy trial
rights, but rather are rooted
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on 29th day of November 2023 at the hour of 9:00 am., or
as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, John Prior,
attorney for Defendant above named will
call up for hearing a hearing for Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Death
Penalty As Arbitrary,
Capricious and Disproportionate before the Honorable Judge Steven W. Boyce District Judge at
JO PRIOR
ttomey for Defendant
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered to the
first PRIOR