United States v. Jesus Manuel Sauseda, 24 F.3d 97, 10th Cir. (1994)
United States v. Jesus Manuel Sauseda, 24 F.3d 97, 10th Cir. (1994)
3d 97
William D. Fry of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces,
NM, for defendant-appellant.
David Williams, Asst. U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, NM, (John J. Kelly, U.S.
Atty., Louis E. Valencia, Asst. U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, NM, on the
brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WHITE, Associate Justice (Ret.); * SEYMOUR, Chief Judge; and
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant challenges both his conviction and sentence. When he was arrested,
he was found to have on his person a .357 magnum pistol loaded with hollow
point bullets, as well as a small amount of cocaine. Both the pistol and the
cocaine were admitted into evidence. Admission of the latter is challenged by
appellant as violative of FED.R.EVID. 404(b)1 because, while the gun formed
the basis for a criminal charge, possession of cocaine was not charged in the
indictment was not relevant evidence to prove any element of the crimes for
which he was on trial. Its admission, it is said, would only indicate appellant's
The trial court admitted the cocaine into evidence on the ground that "whatever
he's got on him when he's arrested, the Government can go into that."
Transcript of Proceedings in the United States District Court at 7. Rule 404(b),
however, excludes evidence of other crimes to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith; its specified grounds for
admitting other-crimes evidence nowhere suggest that evidence of other, but
uncharged, crimes solely because that evidence is found on the body of the
person when arrested should escape the prohibition of the rule. We thus hold
that the stated ground for admitting the cocaine evidence was inadequate.
The Government submits, as it did at trial, that the disputed evidence was
admissible on other grounds consistent with Rule 404(b). We need not deal
with the suggested alternate grounds for admissibility, however, for our
examination of the record convinces us that admitting the cocaine evidence,
even if error, did not affect a substantial right of appellant within the meaning
of FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(a) and FED.R.EVID. 103 and, hence, cannot entitle him
to a new trial or a remand for other action by the trial court.2
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in adjusting upwards his
sentence for obstructing justice by testifying untruthfully. We review such
adjustment only for clear error, and no such error occurred here. As we have
previously said in United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1009, 110 S.Ct. 3252, 111 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990):
7 our review of the trial court's decision to adjust, within the Guidelines, defendant's
In
base offense level under Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines we must "give due regard
to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and
shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous
and shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the
facts." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e).
8
Id. at 1535. See also United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 858, 111 S.Ct. 160, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990); United States v.
Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1573 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112
S.Ct. 1190, 117 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992).
Appellant's conviction and sentence are
Affirmed.